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ABSTRACT 
Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)1 has become an epidemic of global 
legal tax avoidance being used by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs). BEPS has 
resulted in the structuring of transactions within groups of companies, with these 
including: transfer pricing, manipulating prices of goods, services, management fees, 
professional fees, royalties, interest and dividends. 
 
This study is a critical analysis of South African legislation in relation to the Double 
Taxation Agreement (DTA) with the United Kingdom (UK). Reference is made to the 
Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) as proposed by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD).2 Even though South Africa follows the 
OECD guidelines (2010),3 Advance Pricing Agreements (APA) are not included in 
South African legislation, which may result in double non-taxation or double taxation 
and disputes. Recourse in the event of double taxation is examined in this research 
report. 
 
The application of APA legislation in the UK, as a leading tax authority,4 is analysed, 
as well as Davis Tax Committee recommendations in relation to Transfer Pricing. 
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1
  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (n.d.a), ‘About BEPS and 
the inclusive framework’, <http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-about.htm>, retrieved 5 November 
2016. 
2
  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2010b), Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations. Paris: OECD.  
3
  Supra note 2. 
4
  Broomberg, E. B. (2007), Tax avoidance then and now, Tax Planning Corporate and Personal, 
vol. 21, no. 5, pp112-118. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
 
INTRODUCTION ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recognises 
globalisation as the integration of economies, industries and markets.5 Through the 
global network of trade, taxpayers can transact business across borders. This is due 
to the revolutionary developments in communication and technology, the free 
movement of capital and the disappearance of trade barriers.6  
 
The tax consequences of international transactions have resulted in Multinational 
Enterprises (MNEs) conducting their business in such a manner as to reduce the tax 
burden of the groups concerned. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) has 
reported7 on rising tax evasion and the increase in tax inequalities. Due to increasing 
public interest, tax evasion and tax avoidance were further exposed.8 Helman (2014) 
highlighted profit shifting in an article published by Forbes media titled: ‘What 
America’s 15 most profitable companies pay in taxes’.9 The article highlighted the 
fact that international companies such as Google, Apple, Amazon, Facebook and 
Starbucks made use of complex tax structures to shift profits and thus minimise their 
tax bills. The conclusion that can be drawn from the article10 is that MNEs are not 
making a fair fiscal contribution in the economies in which they have a substantial 
economic footprint. 
 
                                            
5
  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2013a), Action Plan on 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. Paris: OECD, p7. 
6
  Supra note 5. 
7
  Barford, V. and Holt, G. (2013), 'Google, Amazon, Starbucks: The rise of tax shaming', 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-20560359>, retrieved 4 November 2016. 
8
  Barford, Supra note 7. 
9
  Helman, C. (2014), 'What America’s most profitable companies pay in taxes', 
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2014/04/15/what-americas-most-profitable-
companies-pay-in-taxes/#48779b29489e>, retrieved 8 July 2016. 
10
  Helman, Supra note 9. 
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In another example Reuters reported, in an article by Bergin (2012)11, that the 
Seattle-based MNE, Starbucks—a multinational coffee retailer with a subsidiary 
based in the United Kingdom (UK)—had avoided tax. Starbucks UK paid only 
£8,6 million in taxes on total sales in excess of £3 billion, since it opened the 
company in 1998.12 In the context of legal13 tax avoidance Bergin stated that the 
Starbucks case ‘sheds light on perfectly legal tactics used by multinationals the world 
over’.14 It further identified that ‘Starbucks stands out because it has told investors 
one thing and the taxman another’.15 
 
In the United States of America (USA) prior to 2012 it was announced that 
government spending would be reduced, resulting in job losses.16 In the multimedia 
publication ‘We’re not broke’ (2012)17 it was emphasised that MNEs are not making 
a fair fiscal contribution, with some US-based MNEs paying minimal or zero taxes in 
the USA. It was recognised by the OECD18 that Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS) is a global problem experienced by revenue authorities. 
 
MNEs make use of complex tax structures to minimise their tax liability. This immoral 
tax behaviour by the exposed MNEs has created awareness regarding profit shifting. 
Syal (2015)19 highlighted that the tax gap due to aggressive tax avoidance in the UK 
alone amounted to £4.4 billion (2015).20 The question thus arises: Are MNEs making 
a fair fiscal contribution in the countries where their main economic activities occur? 
 
                                            
11
 Bergin, T. (2012), Special Report: How Starbucks avoids UK taxes, 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-starbucks-tax-idUSBRE89E0EX20121015>, retrieved 
27 October 2016. 
12
  Bergin, Supra note 11. 
13
  A clear differentiation between legal avoidance and illegal tax evasion has to be emphasised. 
Legal tax avoidance could form part of tax legal planning mechanisms.  
14
  Bergin, Supra note 11. 
15
  Bergin, Supra note 11. 
16
  Hayes, K. and Bruce, V. (2012), We're not broke, video recording, Onshore Productions LLC, 
USA, <http://werenotbrokemovie.com>. 
17
  Supra note 16. 
18
  Supra note 5. 
19
  Syal, R. (2015), 'UK tax fraud costs government £16bn a year, audit report says', 
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/dec/17/uk-tax-costs-government-16bn-each-year-
audit-report-says>, retrieved 27 October 2016. 
20
  Syal, Supra note 19. 
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The OECD launched a research project in 2013 to study the prevention of BEPS.21 
The BEPS project also addressed concerns about transfer pricing, as this is one 
methods used by MNEs to extract profits from a jurisdiction with higher tax rates to a 
jurisdiction with lower or zero tax rates.  
 
Through complex tax planning structures, MNEs obtain a tax benefit: by implication it 
could be said that taxpayers are legally avoiding tax.22 This indicates that globally a 
tax avoidance attitude has emerged and needs to be addressed.  
 
The recommendations on the Actions, as stated in the BEPS project,23 were 
published by the OECD24 and revenue authorities have taken the recommendations 
into consideration. In South Africa the Davis Tax Committee25 indicated in the 
introductory report that it was appointed to review, inter alia, the OECD 
considerations and recommendations and to publish commentary and 
recommendations, specifically from a South African perspective.26 In the UK a similar 
commission was appointed to review the OECD’s recommendations.27  
 
The Davis Tax Committee identified ambiguities in its general comments28 on section 
31 of the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962 and made a specific recommendation29 in this 
regard. Section 3130 relates to ‘Tax payable in respect of international transactions to 
be based on arm’s length principle’.  
 
                                            
21
  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2013a), Action Plan on 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. Paris: OECD. 
22
  Bergin, T. (2012), Special report: How Starbucks avoids UK taxes, 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-starbucks-tax-idUSBRE89E0EX20121015>, retrieved 
27 October 2016. 
23
  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2015), BEPS 2015 Final 
Reports, <http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps-2015-final-reports.htm>, retrieved 15 December 2016. 
24
  Supra note 21. 
25
  Davis Tax Committee (DTC). (2015), Addressing base erosion and profit shifting in South Africa, 
Davis Tax Committee interim report. Pretoria: The Davis Tax Committee. 
26
  Supra note 25. 
27
  The All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG). (n.d.), An examination of the OECD’S BEPS 
recommendations to the G20, <http://www.appgresponsibletax.org.uk/ourwork/oecd-beps/>, 
retrieved 15 December 2016. 
28
  Davis Tax Committee, (2015), BEPS Interim Report on Action Plan 8 – Transfer Pricing of 
Intangibles, p16. 
29
  Supra note 28. 
30
 Section 31, Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962. 
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The Davis Tax Committee’s recommendation states the following: 
 
The legislators should ensure that section 31 of the Income Tax Act refers to the 
OECD guidelines. This is stated in SARS Practice Note 7, but SARS Practice Notes 
are not legally binding. At least one legally binding General Ruling, as provided for in 
section 89 of the Tax Administration Act, 2011, should be enacted on section 31.31  
 
In the context of the research conducted on the commentary and the 
recommendations, inter alia, by the OECD32 and the Davis Tax Committee,33 
together with the lack of Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) legislation in South 
Africa,34 the following research questions need to be addressed:  
 
• Firstly, would Advance Pricing Agreement legislation reduce double taxation 
and transfer pricing disputes?  
• Secondly: Would Advance Pricing Agreement legislation result in taxpayer 
certainty?  
• Thirdly, could South Africa address BEPS with Advance Pricing Agreement 
legislation? 
• Lastly, could automatic exchange of information35 be mutually beneficial to the 
core effectiveness of global tax administration and be an alternative to counter 
BEPS in South Africa?36 
 
The aim of the research is to compare APAs set out in the OECD guidelines (2010)37 
with the application thereof by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and to 
make recommendations for South Africa.38 The need for South Africa to follow 
OECD guidelines (2010)39 and the recommendations made by the Davis Tax 
Committee40 will also be reviewed. 
                                            
31
  Supra note 28. 
32
  Supra note 23. 
33
  Supra note 28. 
34
  Section 80(1)(a)(iii), Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011. 
35
  Supra note 21. 
36
  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2016a), Tax 
administrations and capacity building: A collective challenge. Paris: OECD. 
37
  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2010b), Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations. Paris: OECD. 
38
  Section 218 - 230, Taxation (International and Other Provisions), Act 2010. 
39
  Supra note 37. 
40
  Supra note 28. 
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Since South Africa has no APA legislation, the concept of APAs will be discussed 
together with their related reasons and benefits. 
 
INTRODUCTION TO ADVANCE PRICING AGREEMENTS 
The concept of APAs was introduced in Japan in 198741, one of the first countries to 
adopt such a system. The OECD included Advance Pricing Arrangements in the 
OECD guidelines (2010).42 In this research report the term Advance Pricing 
Agreements (APA) have the same meaning as Advance Pricing Arrangements and 
the two terms are used interchangeably.  The OECD defines Advance Pricing 
Arrangements as follows: 
 
Advance Pricing Arrangement (APA) – An arrangement that determines, in advance of 
controlled transactions, an appropriate set of criteria (e.g. method, comparables and 
appropriate adjustments thereto, critical assumptions as to future events) for the 
determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions over a fixed period of time. 
An advance pricing arrangement may be unilateral involving one tax administration 
and a taxpayer or multilateral involving the agreement of two or more tax 
administrations.43 
 
‘Controlled transactions’ refers to transactions between associated enterprises, 
typically between MNEs. The opportunity could exist for a MNE to agree with a 
revenue authority in advance on how to account for a transaction or annual 
submission of a tax return, referred to as a controlled transaction. 
 
Controlled transactions could inter alia include transfer pricing, payment for services, 
management fees, professional fees, royalties, dividends and interest. ‘Transfer 
pricing is one of the most important issues in international tax.’44 
 
  
                                            
41
  National Tax Agency JAPAN. (n.d.), Reference case studies on application of transfer pricing 
taxation, <https://www.nta.go.jp/foreign_language/08.pdf>, retrieved 15 December 2016. 
42
  Supra note 21, at pp168 - 179. 
43
  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (n.d.b), Glossary of Tax 
Terms, <http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm>, retrieved 5 November 2016. 
44
  Tax Justice Network. (n.d.), Transfer Pricing, <http://www.taxjustice.net/topics/corporate-
tax/transfer-pricing/>, retrieved 6 August 2016. 
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The OECD defines transfer pricing as follows:  
 
Transfer pricing – A transfer price is the price charged by a company for goods, 
services or intangible property to a subsidiary or other related company. Abusive 
transfer pricing occurs when income and expenses are improperly allocated for the 
purpose of reducing taxable income.45 
 
The improper allocation of income and expenses by MNEs could lead to profit 
shifting and the reduction of the liability to pay tax. The OECD recognises that 
transactions between MNEs should be conducted on an arm’s length basis. It is also 
stated that if the arm’s length basis is applied in the same manner as ‘an 
international norm’46 by revenue authorities, mismatches should not arise. The 
OECD defines the arm’s length principle as follows: 
 
Arm’s Length Principle – The international standard which states that, where 
conditions between related enterprises are different from those between independent 
enterprises, profits which have accrued by reason of those conditions may be included 
in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.47  
 
It needs to be emphasised that the pricing of, inter alia, goods and services should 
be based on an open market value of such, or similar, goods and services. An open 
market value is the price independent enterprises would pay for such, or similar, 
goods and services under the same circumstances and at the same point in time.  
 
Calculating the correct arm’s length price in developing countries could be 
challenging since ‘developing countries have a fundamental problem in their distinct 
lack of comparable data’.48 
 
Therefore it can be difficult to calculate the correct arm’s length price in relation to a 
transfer pricing transaction where part of the group has an economic presence in 
developing countries. This is one of the reasons why APAs could be beneficial to 
                                            
45
  Supra note 43. 
46
  SARS. (1999), Income Tax Practice Note No. 7, Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (the 
Act): Determination of the taxable income of certain persons from international transactions: 
Transfer Pricing. Pretoria: SARS. para 7.4. 
47
  Supra note 43. 
48
  taxjustice.net (n.d.), ‘Transfer pricing in developing countries, an introduction’ 
<www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/TP_in_developing_countries.pdf>, retrieved 20 
December 2016. 
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both the taxpayer and a revenue authority, as their use would most likely prevent 
future disputes. It is stated in the OECD guidelines (2010)49 that:  
 
transfer pricing is not an exact science but does require the exercise of judgment on 
the part of both the tax administration and taxpayer.50  
 
Revenue authorities frequently conduct examinations or transfer pricing audits on 
MNEs in relation to controlled transactions. Visser (2016)51 reported that the risk of 
facing transfer pricing audits is rising for MNEs in South Africa.  
 
Calculation of a MNE’s cost allocation with regard to transfer pricing is ‘subjective’52 
and could be based on considerations made by the MNEs to achieve a tax benefit. 
When a revenue authority makes transfer pricing calculations it could have a more 
‘objective’53 view and result in a transfer pricing adjustment. A transfer pricing 
adjustment is defined by the OECD as follows: 
 
Transfer pricing adjustment – Adjustment made by the tax authorities after making a 
determination that a transfer price in a controlled transaction between associated 
enterprises is incorrect or where an allocation of profits fails to conform to the arm's 
length principle.54 
 
Transfer pricing adjustments could be avoided in the event where a taxpayer 
approaches a revenue authority with an application to enter into an APA. The 
revenue authority would follow legislation and relevant processes and procedures 
and could approve the application for an APA. The obligation would be on the 
taxpayer to keep accurate transfer pricing records. Legislation may include an 
annual compliance report to be submitted with the annual tax return. The advantages 
of APAs as stated in the OECD (2012)55 could include taxpayer certainty, protection 
                                            
49
  Supra note 37. 
50
  Supra note 37, at p36. 
51
  Visser, A. (2016), 'The risk of transfer pricing audits is growing for multinationals', 
<https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/economy/2016-11-19-the-risk-of-transfer-pricing-audits-is-
growing-for-multinationals/>, retrieved 15 December 2016. 
52
  Sikka, P. and Willmott, H. (2010), The dark side of transfer pricing: Its role in tax avoidance and 
wealth retentiveness, Centre for Global Accountability. Colchester: University of Essex. 
53
  Supra note 52. 
54
  Supra note 43. 
55
  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).  (2012), Advance Pricing 
Arrangements, Approaches to legislation, <http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-
global/4.%20Advance_Transfer_Pricing_Arrangements.pdf>, retrieved 6 July 2016. 
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against double taxation and promote a better investment climate. This will most likely 
lead to an increase in tax yield. It is important for taxpayers to have certainty 
regarding double taxation issues. The absence of APAs could lead to a situation 
where the taxpayer and a revenue authority are not in agreement on a transfer 
pricing matter. This may result in a transfer pricing adjustment with detrimental 
consequences for the taxpayer.  
 
In the event that a revenue authority makes a transfer pricing adjustment, the 
taxpayer may be liable to pay penalties for the incorrect statement. The South 
African Revenue Service (SARS) has the authority to raise understatement penalties 
of up to 200 percent56 on the tax amount understated. 
 
The burden of proving that an understatement was not made rests on the taxpayer. 
This is stated in section 102(1) of the Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011. Should an 
incorrect statement be made, the MNE could be exposed to a financial risk and be 
obliged to pay taxes that were most likely not budgeted for. 
 
This highlights the need for taxpayers to have certainty on how to determine ‘arm’s 
length’ pricing between associated enterprises that are part of the same MNE. 
Taxpayers could seek professional advice from international tax, accounting, legal 
and advisory firms. In conjunction with professional advice, taxpayers could 
approach the revenue authority for guidance on the tax treatment of a transaction, 
which could be in the form of an Advanced Pricing Agreement or an advance ruling. 
 
As previously stated, in South Africa, SARS does not give rulings on transfer pricing 
matters.57 Therefore, should SARS make a transfer pricing adjustment, it could 
cause a situation of double taxation on a transaction or a portion of a transaction 
between MNEs. The taxpayer would need to seek recourse to correct the double 
taxation. 
 
                                            
56
  Sections 221 – 224, Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011. 
57
  Supra note 34. 
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The first remedy a taxpayer should seek is to dispute the transfer pricing adjustment. 
In South Africa, a taxpayer would follow the dispute resolution procedures as set out 
in Chapter 9 of the Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011. The first step in the dispute 
process is to lodge an objection against an assessment58. If the objection is not 
successful the taxpayer could appeal against the decision.59 It was confirmed that no 
transfer pricing court cases have been reported in South Africa.60 No case law exists 
to give guidance on transfer pricing disputes. 
 
In the event of a transfer pricing dispute the process may involve a lengthy and 
costly legal battle. The fact that a valid dispute61 with regard to double taxation 
exists, allows the taxpayer to make use of an alternative and second remedy, 
namely the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP).62 
 
INTRODUCTION TO TAX TREATIES AND THE MUTUAL AGREEMENT 
PROCEDURE 
The Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) is a mechanism available to taxpayers in 
the event of double taxation or when it is foreseen that double taxation could occur in 
future. The MAP is set out in article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on 
Income and on Capital (2014). The definition and aim of Model Tax Conventions are 
to, inter alia, prevent double taxation. The Model Tax Convention is defined by the 
OECD as follows: 
 
Model Tax Conventions (Treaties) – A model tax treaty is designed to streamline and 
achieve uniformity in the allocation of taxing rights between countries in cross-border 
situations. Model tax treaties developed by OECD and UN are widely used and a 
number of countries have their own model treaties.63 
 
                                            
58
  Section 104, Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011. 
59
  Section 107, Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011. 
60
  Honiball, M. (2016), e-mail, 19 December 2016. 
61
  Section 104 - 107, Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011. 
62
  SARS. (n.d.), Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP), <http://www.sars.gov.za/Legal/International-
Treaties-Agreements/DTA-Protocols/Pages/Mutual-Agreement-Procedure.aspx>, retrieved 16 
December 2016. 
63
  Supra note 43. 
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It should be kept in mind that article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on 
Income and on Capital (2014) should be read and applied in the context of the 
objective of the Convention64 and regard should be given to the OECD commentary 
in relation to the Convention. 
 
The MAP is defined by the OECD as follows: 
 
Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) – A means through which tax administrations 
consult to resolve disputes regarding the application of double tax conventions. This 
procedure, described and authorized by Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention, can be used to eliminate double taxation that could arise from a transfer 
pricing adjustment.65 
 
The MAP could be applied in the event of ‘cross border tax disputes’.66 It is also 
further stated that the MAP might ‘include issues of transfer pricing’67 in the event of 
double taxation on a cross border transaction within a MNE. A taxpayer who is not in 
agreement with the tax treatment of a transaction that attracts double taxation, 
should follow domestic dispute resolution procedures and could apply for a MAP as 
a mechanism to correct the disparity. The OECD has published68 the profiles of 
competent authorities of participating countries in regard to how to apply for the 
MAP. It should be noted that once a taxpayer has applied for the MAP, the matter is 
not between the taxpayer and the revenue authority. It becomes a negotiation 
between the contracting states. 
 
It is highlighted by the OECD that: 
 
it is important to note that article 25(2) obliges the two states to negotiate, but the two 
states are merely obliged to use their best endeavours to reach mutual agreement and 
are not obliged to reach a specific agreement.69  
 
                                            
64
  OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2014). 
65
  Article 25, OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2014). 
66
  De Koker, A.P. and Brincker, E. (ed.), (2010), Silke on International Income Tax. Durban: 
LexisNexis, para 38.1. 
67
  De Koker and Brincker, Supra note 66 at para 38.1.1. 
68
  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (n.d.c), ‘MAP Profiles’, 
<http://www.oecd.org/ctp/dispute/country-map-profiles.htm>, retrieved 17 December 2016. 
69
  De Koker and Brincker, Supra note 66 at para 38.1.4. 
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The contracting states may give a mandate to the competent authorities of both 
contracting states in relation to a Double Taxation Agreement (DTA), who could then 
reach some form of agreement. 
 
It is stated in the Manual on Effective Mutual Agreement Procedures (MEMAP)70 that 
should the competent authorities reach an agreement, the contracting states should 
exchange letters ‘and where required the taxpayer has accepted the resolution, a 
competent authority should give, or arrange to give, it effect in its jurisdiction’.71 
 
It is important to note that a taxpayer should first follow the dispute process 
applicable in the tax jurisdiction where the double taxation has occurred. In South 
Africa the MAP is available if a valid dispute exists and could be applied for during 
any stage of the dispute process.72 The MAP is available as remedy for the disparity 
but should not be undertaken in conjunction with the dispute process as applied in 
domestic law. The dispute process could be halted as applying the MAP and 
following the dispute process may lead to ‘a duplication of efforts’73, which should be 
avoided. 
 
The MEMAP74 gives clarity on the ‘interaction between MAP and domestic recourse 
provisions’.75 It is stated that should the MAP not be successful, the taxpayer could 
still choose ‘domestic recourse’.76  
 
The Convention77 indicates that a taxpayer should submit the application within three 
years after having first received notification of the action resulting in taxation not in 
accordance with the provision of the Convention.78 The MEMAP79 indicates that the 
ideal time frame for a MAP to reach finalisation should be within two years. 
                                            
70
  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2007), Manual on Effective 
Mutual Agreement Procedures (MEMAP). Paris: OECD. 
71
  Supra note 70 at para 3.8. 
72
  De Koker and Brincker, Supra note 66 at para 38.1.5. 
73
  De Koker and Brincker, Supra note 72 at para 38.1.5. 
74
  Supra note 70, at para 4.1. 
75
  Supra note 74. 
76
  Supra note 74. 
77
  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2014), Model tax 
convention on income and on capital. Paris: OECD. 
78
  Article 25(1), OECD model tax convention on income and capital (2014). 
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Double taxation occurs, inter alia, when multiple revenue authorities either apply 
different interpretations of the arm’s length principle or apply different interpretations 
on the allocation of taxing rights as set out in a treaty. 
 
For example, in the UK the MAP would be applied when it is foreseen that double 
taxation is imminent. APAs are therefore included in the domestic law80 of the UK.  
 
To illustrate the disparity in the treatment of transfer pricing and APAs, the tax 
treaty81 between South Africa and the UK is used as an example. The UK is a 
member of the OECD, HMRC is a leading tax authority82 and UK tax legislation 
makes provision for Advance Pricing Arrangements. 
 
South Africa and the UK entered into a tax treaty. The full title of the treaty is: The 
Convention between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the 
avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on Income and Capital gains. The treaty is commonly referred to as the DTA 
with the UK.83  
 
The treaty between South Africa and the UK is based on the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital,84 also referred to as the OECD Model Tax 
Convention.  
 
The aim of tax treaties is to establish taxing rights between contracting states as well 
as prevent double taxation. Tax treaties do not address the fact that in certain 
instances, double non-taxation could occur with little or no remedy.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
79
  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (1999), Guidelines for 
conducting Advance Pricing Arrangements under the Mutual Agreement Procedure (‘MAP 
APAs’) Annex (1999). Paris: OECD. 
80
  Section 218 - 230, Taxation (International and Other Provisions), Act 2010. 
81
  South African Government Gazette. (2003), SA/UK DTA, Government Gazette No. 24335 dated 
31 January 2003. 
82
 Broomberg, E. B. (2007), Tax avoidance then and now, Tax planning corporate and personal, 
vol. 21, no. 5, pp112-118. 
83
  Supra note 81. 
84
  Supra note 77. 
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Article 24(2) of the SA/UK DTA85 could be interpreted and applied differently by 
SARS and HMRC. South Africa does not recognise the possibility of double taxation, 
since the MAP is only available as a remedy after the occurrence of double taxation.  
 
The UK recognises that double taxation could occur and then follows the OECD 
guidelines (2010)86, and may engage in negotiations with other contracting states 
where such double taxation could occur. An APA could be made with other 
contracting states under the provisions of article 24(2).87  
 
South Africa does not follow this application of the OECD guidelines (2010)88 and 
therefore application of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
(2014) could lead to inconsistency and double taxation. 
 
The specific exclusion of APAs in South Africa89 creates a direct disparity of the 
application of the MAP by SARS and HMRC. This creates the possibility of double 
taxation and could detract from taxpayer certainty with regard to the treatment of a 
transfer pricing transaction. 
  
                                            
85
  Article 24(2), SA/UK DTA, Government Gazette No. 24335 dated 31 January 2003. 
86
  Supra note 37. 
87
  Supra note 85. 
88
  Supra note 37. 
89
  Supra note 34. 
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RESEARCH PROBLEM AND SUB-PROBLEMS 
The statement of the problem 
The key problem is the specific exclusion of pricing agreements from the Advance 
Ruling provisions as set out in Chapter 7 of the South African Tax Administration Act, 
28 of 2011. The absence of APA legislation in South Africa may create a disparity 
due to the fact that the MAP is not available as a remedy in South Africa, until after 
the event of tax. A mismatch occurs that may cause double taxation with regard to 
international transactions and disputes. 
 
Oguttu (2006)90 has conducted research on APAs. International developments since 
the BEPS project (OECD 2013)91 and the introduction of the Tax Administration Act92 
have added new dimensions to the problem of resolving transfer pricing disputes and 
these developments need to be critically analysed. The Davis Tax Committee93 has 
made recommendations on the BEPS project, which will be considered. 
 
In South Africa the MAP is a process governed under treaty provisions and is only 
applicable firstly, after the event of tax; secondly, after a transfer pricing adjustment 
has been made by the relevant revenue authority; and lastly after any double 
taxation disputes have arisen within domestic legislation. 
 
The OECD (2012)94 has conducted research on Advance Pricing Arrangements95 as 
applied in the UK. It was reported that Advance Pricing legislation is available to 
taxpayers in the UK seeking certainty on the tax treatment of a transfer pricing 
transaction, before the event of tax. This could create a disparity in the tax treatment 
of a transaction by SARS and HMRC. Double taxation of a transaction or a portion 
thereof could lead to the taxpayer following the dispute process. The dispute process 
is set out in Chapter 9 of the South African Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011. The 
                                            
90
  Oguttu, A.W. (2006), Resolving transfer pricing disputes: Are Advance Pricing Agreements the 
way forward for South Africa? SA Mercantile Law Journal 18 pp60-485. 
91
  Supra note 21. 
92
  Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011. 
93
  Supra note 28. 
94
  Supra note 55. 
95
  Supra note 55. 
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taxpayer bears the burden96 of proving that an amount, transaction, event or item is 
exempt or otherwise not taxable. Taxpayer uncertainty and the dispute process have 
a direct link. The burden is on the taxpayer to prove that the transaction had been 
conducted at an arm’s length basis.97 When SARS conducts an audit and makes a 
transfer pricing adjustment, with which the taxpayer is not in agreement, this could 
lead to the dispute process. If taxpayers had the opportunity to obtain certainty on 
the treatment of a transaction in advance, this could eliminate transfer pricing 
adjustments and disputes. This in turn could eliminate unnecessary time and 
resources being wasted on resolving transfer pricing disputes.  
 
The objective of this report is to critically analyse APAs98 and highlight the benefits, 
risks, advantages, disadvantages and challenges of introducing such from a South 
African perspective.  
 
The second objective of this report is to critically analyse and compare the Davis Tax 
Committee’s recommendations with the OECD proposals on the treatment of arm’s 
length transactions. This would assist in recommending a way forward to prevent 
BEPS on the basis of the equal treatment of arm’s length transactions across 
borders. 
 
The sub-problems 
The first sub-problem aims to highlight the issues arising from the exclusion of APAs 
from South African tax legislation, specifically since the introduction of the Tax 
Administration Act, 28 of 2011. A critical analysis of how Advanced Pricing 
Agreements are applied in the UK by HMRC should further explain the concept 
under review.  
 
The second sub-problem deals with the event of taxation and the DTA between 
South Africa and the UK. The question is aimed at the mismatch of legislation 
                                            
96
 Section 102(1), Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011. 
97
 Davis Tax Committee, (2015) BEPS Interim Report on Action Plan 13 – Transfer Pricing 
Documentation, p15. 
98
  Supra note 96. 
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regarding APAs and the treatment of transfer pricing adjustments by the relevant tax 
authorities. Transfer pricing guidelines, as published by the OECD (2010), are 
viewed as international best practice and will be discussed. The MAP in the event of 
double taxation will also be reviewed.  
 
The third sub-problem arises from the question of whether APAs could reduce 
disputes between SARS and taxpayers with regard to transfer pricing adjustments 
and disputes. The question also seeks to address the possibility of an increase or a 
decrease in revenue from Multinational Enterprises. 
 
The last sub-problem questions the factors that need to be considered in relation to 
APAs. The question is whether BEPS could be prevented or reduced if South African 
legislation permitted APAs. Alternatively, would multilateral and bilateral information 
sharing agreements between revenue authorities resolve the problem of mispricing? 
 
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of this research is to determine whether the South African domestic 
legislation and the specific exclusion of advance tax rulings are in line with the 
OECD (2010) recommendations. The scope of the research is based on the OECD 
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2014) and compares the SA/UK 
DTA in relation to APAs. The UK makes use of APA legislation and is an OECD 
partner. 
 
The research report also examines the reasons for the exclusion in legislation of 
advance rulings relating to transfer pricing of goods and services between MNEs and 
focuses on the following facts and uncertainties: 
• South Africa is a developing country; 
• South Africa may not have the skills or capacity to conduct an APA 
programme; and 
• Alternative measures that could be taken to avoid double taxation and 
disparities that might occur in the application of legislation and DTAs. 
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METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
In the light of BEPS, a critical analysis was undertaken to compare the APAs as 
included in the OECD Guidelines on transfer pricing (2010). South African domestic 
legislation was investigated to address situations of disparity should double taxation 
occur. Tax legislation governing situations of double taxation was reviewed. The 
absence of advance tax rulings on transfer pricing of goods and services was also 
analysed and compared with APAs as applied in the UK. Legislation, together with 
the DTA between South Africa and the UK, was analysed. Information was gathered, 
critically analysed and investigated. The main resources pertain to literature in the 
form of articles, books and publicly published information. 
18 
 
CHAPTER 2: SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATION CONTRASTED 
WITH THE APPLICATION OF ADVANCE PRICING 
AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM BASED ON OECD 
GUIDELINES (2010) 
 
THE EXCLUSION OF ADVANCE RULINGS ON ADVANCE PRICING 
AGREEMENTS FROM SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATION 
Chapter 7 of the Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011, deals with how the South 
African Revenue Service (SARS) administers advance rulings. Broadly, ‘advance 
rulings’99 are differentiated between ‘binding general rulings’, ‘binding private rulings’ 
and/or ‘binding class rulings’.100 
 
It should be emphasised that SARS does not give ‘advance rulings’101 on transfer 
pricing matters. The provisions of section 80(a)(iii) of the Tax Administration Act, 28 
of 2011,102 indicate that SARS will not even consider an application if it relates to 
transfer pricing between connected persons. 
 
Section 80 states:103  
 
Rejection of application for advance ruling.—(1) SARS may reject an “application” for 
an “advance ruling” if the “application”— 
(a)  requests or requires the rendering of an opinion, conclusion or determination 
regarding— 
(iii)   the pricing of goods or services supplied by or rendered to a connected 
person in relation to the “applicant” or a “class member”; …  
 
Reasons for the exclusion of ‘advance rulings’104 on transfer pricing matters, 
between connected parties, are not known.105 It is certain that the specific exclusion 
                                            
99
  Section 75, Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011. 
100
  Sections 75 - 90, Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011. 
101
  Supra note 100. 
102
 Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011. 
103
  Supra note 102. 
104
  Section 80(1)(a)(iii), Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011. 
19 
 
of ‘advance rulings’, in this context, is not in line with the guidelines106 published by 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The 
guideline, inter alia, includes transfer pricing and Advance Pricing Agreements 
(APAs).107 
 
Before or during the structuring of a cross border transaction, Multinational 
Enterprises (MNEs) would give careful consideration to the tax implications of the 
transaction. MNEs would aim to structure a cross border transaction in such a way 
as to pay the least amount in tax legally allowable. Also, MNEs would give careful 
consideration to determining a fair and reasonable price at which goods and services 
are provided for. The arm’s length price108 of a transaction must be calculated. 
 
The MNE may be liable for tax in various jurisdictions and the relevant tax legislation 
in each tax jurisdiction needs to be considered. Various revenue authorities may deal 
with transfer pricing differently in relation to the same transaction. 
 
Therefore MNEs may seek certainty regarding the tax treatment of a transaction, 
when conducting cross border transactions. Certainty would be required to reduce 
the risk of transfer pricing adjustments and penalties. The tax treatment of a 
transaction could mean a greater or smaller profit margin for the group. One should 
not forget that the reputation of a company, in handling its tax affairs, could influence 
investors’ confidence. 
 
Research conducted on Advance Pricing Arrangements: Approaches to 
Legislation109 indicated that certain OECD and non-OECD countries have adopted 
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 Olivier, L. and Honiball, M. (2011), International tax: A South African perspective, 5th edn. Cape 
Town: Siber Ink, p638. 
106
  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2010b), Transfer pricing 
guidelines for multinational enterprises and tax administrations. Paris: OECD. 
107
  Supra note 106. 
108
  taxjustice.net (n.d.), Transfer pricing in developing countries, an introduction 
<www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/TP_in_developing_countries.pdf>, retrieved 20 
December 2016. 
109
  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).  (2012), advance pricing 
arrangements, approaches to legislation, <http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-
global/4.%20Advance_Transfer_Pricing_Arrangements.pdf>, retrieved 6 July 2016. 
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Advance Pricing rules to allow APAs.  The definition of Advance Pricing 
Arrangements110 is cited in the OECD’s terms of reference as:  
 
An arrangement that determines, in advance of controlled transactions, an appropriate 
set of criteria (e.g. method, comparables and appropriate adjustments thereto, critical 
assumptions as to future events) for the determination of the transfer pricing for those 
transactions over a fixed period of time. An advance pricing agreement may be 
unilateral involving one tax administration and a taxpayer or multilateral involving the 
agreement of two or more tax administrations.111 
 
The OECD also recognises the arm’s length principle, which is:  
 
[t]he international standard which states that, where conditions between related 
enterprises are different from those between independent enterprises, profits which 
have accrued by reason of those conditions may be included in the profits of that 
enterprise and taxed accordingly.112 
 
The OECD adopted APAs in October 1999113 to supplement the traditional, 
administrative, judicial and treaty mechanisms of resolving transfer pricing issues.114 
The concept of APAs is based on a taxpayer or MNE approaching one or more 
revenue authorities, in order to agree in advance on the transfer pricing methodology 
and variables applicable to each unique case. For example, a company should 
determine the profit margin of selling a product to another company in the group at 
an arm’s length price and the terms of the APA will be agreed between the taxpayer 
and the revenue authority during the process of reaching the terms of agreement. 
 
The same arm’s length principle would apply to the pricing of goods, services, 
management fees, professional fees, royalties, interest and the payment of 
dividends.  
 
The taxpayer is responsible for making clear declarations to the revenue authorities 
and is aware of the fact that if any misrepresentations or fraud are later discovered, 
                                            
110
  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (n.d.b), Glossary of tax 
terms, <http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm>, retrieved 5 November 2016. 
111
  Supra note 110. 
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  Supra note 110. 
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  Supra note 106, at p168. 
114
  Ibid note 113. 
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the APA will be null and void. The regulations regarding the burden of proof would 
differ depending on the domestic legislation of each treaty party.  
 
The OECD identified that ‘some countries allow for unilateral arrangements where 
the tax administration and the taxpayer in its jurisdiction establish an arrangement 
without the involvement of the other interested tax administrations’.115 If a unilateral 
APA was reached, it is the responsibility of the tax administration to inform the other 
relevant tax administrations of the APA reached with the taxpayer.  
 
Where a taxpayer makes use of a unilateral APA, it should be clearly indicated that 
the taxpayer is not waiving its right to access the Mutual Agreement Procedure 
(MAP),116 should a transfer pricing dispute arise. It is important that a taxpayer party 
to an APA should be able to dispute double taxation under treaty provisions, such as 
the MAP.  
 
Should a transfer pricing dispute arise which cannot be resolved, it would mean that 
the MNE would be taxed twice on the same transaction or a portion thereof.  
 
MNEs should be aware of the fact that a tax jurisdiction could view a transaction as 
not being at arm’s length and make a transfer pricing adjustment. In order to 
eliminate or reduce the risk of a transfer pricing adjustment, they would enter into an 
APA with the relevant tax administration. 
 
It could be said that the purpose of an APA117 would be to provide the taxpayer with 
certainty of the tax treatment of a transaction prior to the implementation. APAs 
between a taxpayer and the relevant tax authority could avoid pricing adjustments 
and penalties for the incorrect treatment of a transaction for tax purposes. APAs 
could aid in the prevention of double taxation. 
 
                                            
115
  Supra note 106, at p169. 
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  Supra note 106, at p169. 
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  Supra note 109. 
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It should be pointed out that the annex to Chapter IV118 indicates that it is possible 
for revenue authorities to follow the MAP119 to agree on a multilateral APA. Such an 
agreement would be referred to as a ‘MAP APA’ by the OECD.120 It should be noted 
that the OECD guidelines on Transfer Pricing were based on the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and Capital (2010). The articles of the convention should be 
referred to when considering the following interpretation. 
 
The MAP is set out in article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and 
on Capital (2014).121  Article 25122 provides a guideline for the allocation of taxing 
rights and is not obligatory but rather an endeavour to reach an agreement.123  
 
Before the MAP is considered, article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on 
Income and on Capital, which deals with associated enterprises, should be 
considered and applied. Associated enterprises are connected parties in relation to a 
MNE. 
 
Article 9 124 specifically addresses associated enterprises which conduct business in 
several tax jurisdictions and stipulates that transactions should be dealt with at an 
arm’s length basis. The provisions of article 9125 grant authority to allocate taxing 
rights to the relevant tax authorities when cross border transactions take place.  
 
Taxpayers and revenue authorities may enter into a unilateral APA or a similar 
agreement where the revenue authority is in agreement with a taxpayer’s transfer 
pricing method and profit allocation to its revenue jurisdiction. Another revenue 
authority may not view the method as being applicable in its economy and could 
make a transfer pricing adjustment. 
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Since transfer pricing disputes could lead to lengthy disputes between taxpayers and 
revenue authorities, and eventual disputes between revenue authorities under treaty 
provisions, it would be preferable if revenue authorities could enter into bilateral or 
multilateral APAs before the event of taxation. This ‘reduces the risk of double 
taxation, will be equitable to all tax administrations and taxpayers involved and will 
provide greater certainty to the taxpayers concerned’.126  
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing guidelines (2010) identified that some countries’ 
domestic provisions do not permit the tax administration to enter into binding 
agreements directly with taxpayers. It also states that APAs can be concluded with 
the competent authority of a treaty partner only under the MAP.127 The main problem 
is that South Africa does not have Advance Pricing legislation and that Advance 
Pricing is specifically excluded from the Advance Ruling process, set out in 
Chapter 7 of the Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011. 
 
This disparity could directly lead to double taxation of a transaction or a portion of a 
transaction.  
 
DOUBLE TAXATION IN RELATION TO THE SAME TRANSACTION 
The event of double taxation could be illustrated with the following example. Where a 
Multinational Enterprise consists of entities that hold residency in South Africa, the 
United Kingdom (UK) and perhaps in an additional tax jurisdiction, for taxation 
purposes it would be treated differently in South Africa than in the other jurisdictions. 
The probability exists that in the event of SARS making a transfer pricing adjustment, 
the taxpayer would be taxed on the same income in more than one tax jurisdiction 
and that the MAP, together with domestic legislation, would be available to the 
taxpayer in order to correct this disparity.  
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The dispute resolution procedure as set out in Chapter 9 of the Tax Administration 
Act,128 together with article 9129 and the MAP between competent authorities is an 
administrative burden on the taxpayer and the relevant tax authorities, which could 
have been avoided by an APA. 
 
The UK has an Advance Pricing programme and this illustrates how disputes and the 
administrative burden could be shifted to the taxpayer prior to assessment. The 
Advance Pricing programme could prevent double taxation to some extent. 
 
Double taxation could occur if one or more tax administrations take a different view 
of the arm’s length principle, upon examining the transactions between MNEs. It 
would be ideal to have a mutual APA between the MNE and the relevant tax 
authorities. Since the domestic legislation of each country differs, the tax treatment 
of transactions by different revenue authorities could vary and this could lead to 
double taxation. 
 
The predicament of double taxation would occur when an MNE has a unilateral 
advance pricing agreement only with its own tax authority. The group still does not 
have certainty over the tax treatment of the transaction by revenue authorities in 
other jurisdictions. The arm’s length principle could be interpreted in varying ways 
and result in transfer pricing adjustments by other revenue authorities in jurisdictions 
where the MNE trades.  The South African view on arm’s length transactions is that 
this is an international standard, which should be applied equally by tax authorities in 
order to ‘minimise the potential for double taxation’.130  
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
administrations (2010) clearly point out that they seek to facilitate both equitable 
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allocation of taxes between jurisdictions and the prevention of double taxation of 
taxpayers.131 
 
For the purposes of this paper, the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital (2014) forms the basis on which double taxation is addressed in South Africa 
as well as in the UK. The UK has an Advance Pricing programme illustrating how 
APAs are applied by Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC). 
 
ADVANCE PRICING AGREEMENTS AS APPLIED IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
The OECD conducted research on the treatment of APAs in the UK.132 It stated that 
the UK adopted unilateral, bilateral and multilateral APAs in practice. The scope of 
the APAs133 includes the determination of arm’s length pricing between connected 
enterprises, plus the attribution of profit when an enterprise is liable for tax in another 
jurisdiction as well as in the UK. APAs for transfer pricing related matters are usually 
agreed in advance and would be effective for a time period of three to five years.134 
When the term expires, the taxpayer would apply for a new APA.  
 
Thin capitalisation matters are dealt with in a separate programme by HMRC 
namely: Advance Thin Capitalisation Agreements (ATCA).135 
 
The effect of the APA would be that HMRC provides certainty on how it will treat the 
transfer pricing matters as agreed on. From the taxpayer’s perspective, an obligation 
is created to ensure that the agreed methods of pricing or allocation of profits are 
adhered to. The taxpayer also has to furnish an annual report136 confirming 
adherence to the APA: this accompanies the taxpayer’s annual return. From the 
revenue authority’s perspective, this reduces transfer pricing audits and builds 
capacity for compliance. 
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HMRC frequently updates the Statement of Practice 2 (2010).137 The policy paper by 
HMRC is a general guide in relation to APAs and the interpretation of legislation. It is 
stated that ‘the legislation that relates to APAs appears at Sections 218 - 230 of the 
Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 (TIOPA)’.138 
 
Legislation in the UK regarding APAs is well-developed and has been applied since 
1999. Since taxpayers’ affairs are subject to secrecy provisions, HMRC does not 
make APAs public. HMRC will engage with the competent authority of another tax 
jurisdiction in the event where a bilateral or multilateral pricing agreement is sought 
or to be agreed upon. HMRC may provide the APA to another tax jurisdiction where 
the taxpayer or the group of companies has a direct or indirect economic presence. 
 
For this reason no commentary could be given on how effective the APA programme 
is in the UK. It could be said that the legislation is meticulous and the application 
process can take between 18 and 21 months139 to reach an agreement. 
 
An ‘advance pricing agreement’ is defined in section 218140 as a written agreement 
between the Commissioners with any person in terms of an application for an 
agreement which relates to one or more matters regarding the attribution of income 
in relation to international trading as well as the treatment for tax purposes between 
the company and any associate as defined in section 219141. 
 
The Statement of Practice142 clearly indicates that the terms to be adhered to are the 
agreed method for dealing with transfer pricing issues and that a regular compliance 
report is required as stipulated in section 228.143 It further states that the taxpayer 
must identify critical assumptions that are material to the agreed transfer pricing 
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method. If the taxpayer does not notify HMRC of any changes to the critical 
assumptions, the APA may be rendered invalid.144 
 
Analysis of the provisions relating to APAs145 shows that a major, in-depth process 
must be followed before finally reaching an agreement… that could still be revoked 
or invalidated as a result of unintentional miscalculation, omission of reporting or 
intentional misrepresentation. 
 
It is clear that HMRC has the authority to modify or revoke146 an agreement when it 
is found that the transfer pricing method or any critical assumptions have changed 
due to external influences, such as the economy or the economies of other countries 
or industries. The agreement will be modified on the terms HMRC proposes and a 
new agreement will be entered into between HMRC and the taxpayer. 
 
If the taxpayer and HMRC cannot agree on new terms of an agreement, the previous 
APA will be revoked. In essence this means the agreement is nullified, as if it had 
never existed. It could be said that the application process and the revocation of an 
agreement might be as much of an administrative process as a transfer pricing audit. 
The only difference is that the taxpayer would have guidance regarding recourse 
before submitting a tax return, where a transfer pricing audit is conducted after an 
assessment on income has been issued. Transfer pricing adjustments could lead to 
heavy penalties and compounded interest. 
 
The risk of a taxpayer misleading the revenue authorities will always be a reality. 
Taxpayers will always attempt to minimise their tax liability within the boundaries of 
legislation. The interpretation of legislation—and in particular the complex transfer 
pricing methods and limited comparable data available—could lead to a situation 
where a taxpayer takes advantage and misleads the tax authorities.  
 
During the application process and reaching of an Advanced Pricing Agreement, the 
taxpayer submits relevant information over a period of up to 21 months. If agreement 
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is reached, HMRC enters into the Advanced Pricing Agreement based on the facts 
presented and declarations made by the taxpayer. The facts should have been 
carefully scrutinised before an agreement was reached. The taxpayer would still 
need to report on an annual basis upon submission of the annual tax return. HMRC 
would scrutinise the annual report and retrospectively test if the terms of the 
agreement are valid. In the event of misrepresentation of facts, HMRC will nullify the 
APA.147 The penalty for misrepresentation in connection with an Advanced Pricing 
Agreement is not more than £10,000.148 This is a fixed penalty without discretion to 
reduce, remit or waive it. 
 
The UK’s Advance Pricing legislation makes provision for the modification of 
agreements for double taxation purposes.149 Modification of Advanced Pricing 
Agreements would be applicable firstly, if double taxation occurred and the MAP was 
followed in terms of any Double Taxation Agreement (DTA). Secondly, if any DTA is 
inconsistent with the terms of an APA. 
 
This provision150 provides flexibility in the event of a transfer pricing adjustment 
made by a treaty partner of the UK. In the process of resolving double taxation, the 
contracting states will follow the MAP151 and agree on allocation of profits.152 Double 
taxation will be avoided, even though the necessary process may be lengthy.  
 
In contrast with South Africa, the UK allows for APAs and determines in advance the 
transfer pricing method, before assessment of tax. South Africa has not yet 
formalised the self-assessment process for income tax. This could, inter alia, be one 
reason why transfer pricing audits are conducted after the annual assessment and in 
the event of tax being levied. 
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THE SOUTH AFRICAN TREATMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSACTIONS IN RELATION TO TRANSFER PRICING 
The history of transfer pricing in South Africa is significant. The content of old 
Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962 was replaced by new content in 
1995.153 This formed the basis of the transfer pricing basic principles still applied 
today. The legislation was reformed in 1995 after international trading restrictions 
against South Africa had been lifted in 1994. 
 
SARS issued Practice Note 7 (1999) to serve as a guide for the interpretation and 
application of section 31,154 and this specifically refers to the ‘determination of 
taxable income of certain persons from international transactions and transfer 
pricing’.155 Practice Note 7 (1999) was based on the OECD Report on Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (1995).156  
The OECD has since updated and issued new guidelines on transfer pricing, the 
latest ones being published in 2010.157 Practice Note 7 (1999) is the only endorsed 
guide on transfer pricing matters in South Africa. It is however not a binding 
document. 
 
Section 108 of the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962 empowers SARS to enter into DTAs. 
DTAs aim to prevent, or grant relief from, double taxation.158 During this research, 
the DTA between South Africa and the UK was compared with the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital (2014). It is concluded that numerous articles 
in the DTA and the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2014) 
have similar headings and the content of these articles is similar. 
  
South Africa is a not a member of the OECD, however, participates as a key partner 
of the OECD.159 SARS, as the Tax Administration in South Africa, applies OECD 
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policies, recommendations and the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital (2014), with reservations on matters with which it is not in agreement.160 
 
The main South African reservation regarding the OECD Model Tax Convention on 
Income and on Capital (2014) was that South Africa reserved the right to apply the 
allocation of business profits as stated in article 7.161 
 
Article 14162 was deleted from the OECD Model Tax convention on Income and on 
Capital prior to 2008. For this reason the numbering of articles in the South African 
DTA does not match the numbering of the OECD Model Tax Convention (2014). 
This observation is important since the MAP discussed in this research makes 
reference to the numbering of the articles.163 The DTA refers to article 24.164  
 
A DTA is an agreement between two contracting states. The purpose of a DTA is to 
avoid double taxation and to determine the allocation of profits and taxing rights. 
During the interpretation process of a DTA, relevant provisions should be analysed 
and it should be determined which provisions are applicable. In order to illustrate the 
point, provisions set out in article 7165 should be applied before the provisions in 
article 9 are interpreted and applied.166 Firstly, article 7167 directs how business 
profits are attributed to Permanent Establishments (PE) in the case of a MNE that 
conducts business in both contracting states. Secondly, article 9168 stipulates the 
taxing rights of contracting states in relation to the same transaction in the case of 
associated enterprises conducting business in both tax jurisdictions. 
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Oguttu (2006) carried out research on Resolving transfer pricing disputes: Are 
‘Advance Pricing Agreements’ the way forward for South Africa?169 The paper makes 
reference to the SARS Practice Note 7 (1999) and also commented that the guide is 
not binding and that taxpayers were uncertain about how SARS would interpret the 
arm’s length principle. Commentary170 included the observation that the 
Commissioner of SARS may not accept any application from a taxpayer for an 
advance ruling in respect of the pricing of goods or services supplied by, or rendered 
to, a connected person in relation to the applicant or to a class member in the case 
of an application for a binding class ruling.171  
 
Critical remarks in the paper172 indicate that SARS should consider Advance Pricing 
legislation irrespective of the criticism that APAs would not solve all transfer pricing 
disputes.  
 
With the introduction of the Tax Administration Act173 no new solutions to transfer 
pricing disputes were addressed, although recommended in the research.174 The 
new provisions in the Tax Administration Act175 are still applied as previously stated 
in the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962. 
 
The Tax Administration Act176 came into effect on 1 October 2012 and Practice Note 
7 (1999) was not retracted. It is still available as a guide even though it is not 
binding.177 SARS published a draft Interpretation Note178 in relation to section 31.179 
The due date for commenting by the public was on 30 June 2013. The Interpretation 
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Note180 is still in draft format and could be revised or retracted by SARS. The draft 
Interpretation Note deals with Section 31,181 with the subject title ‘Determination of 
the taxable income of certain persons from international transactions: Thin 
Capitalisation’.182 
 
Firstly, the subject title of the draft Interpretation Note makes it appear the document 
only relates to ‘Thin Capitalisation’.183 This is the interest rate agreed on between 
connected persons in relation to a cross border transaction that is not at arm’s 
length. In layman’s terms, the capital invested and the terms of the agreement 
between connected companies that are part of a MNE do not justify the high interest 
payments claimed as a deduction.  
 
Secondly, by implication the subject title is misleading since it quotes section 31 of 
the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962 and omits to state that the document excludes 
transfer pricing matters related to goods and services supplied and rendered 
between associated enterprises. Thus it actually only covers interest payments 
between associated enterprises, which is not at arm’s length. 
 
Lastly, it could be said that the draft Interpretation Note184 does give some guidance 
on SARS’ intentions in regard to the application of the arm’s length principle. Even 
though it is applied to Thin Capitalisation, it states that: 
 
[g]uidance on the application of and adherence to the arm’s length basis can be found 
in the OECD guidelines.185  
 
The Draft Interpretation Note186 further states that the Advance Agreement Process 
is not currently available in South Africa. 
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It is not known why the document is still in draft format and why it has not been 
formalised and published as a final document. Formalisation of the draft 
Interpretation Note could have been delayed, since frequent adjustments are made 
to the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962, and new considerations could be applicable. 
 
TAX REFORMATION IN LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL TAX 
DEVELOPMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE DAVIS TAX 
COMMITTEE 
 
It is good practice for a tax administration to keep up to date with international 
developments and best practice. Since MNEs trade across borders, South Africa 
should not ignore Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). The British Broadcasting 
Corporation’s coverage of the case of Barford and Holt (2013) ‘Google, Amazon, 
Starbucks: The rise of tax shaming’, indicated that profit shifting and legal tax 
avoidance is a reality.187 Revenue authorities are exposed to the risk of tax leakage, 
which is to the detriment of their economies and citizens.  
 
This led in 2013 to the OECD commencing a research project focussing on BEPS.188 
At the instruction of the Minister of Finance,189 South Africa—as an observer of the 
OECD—participated in the BEPS project. The research mandate190 was to 
investigate and make recommendations, inter alia, on Profit Shifting and tax leakage. 
 
Tax leakage and transfer pricing have a direct link. Research was conducted by the 
OECD191 with regard to transfer pricing guidelines for MNEs. After the launch of the 
BEPS project192 further research with regard to transfer pricing was conducted and 
dealt with in action plans 8, 9, 10 and 13.193 The Davis Tax Committee (DTC) was 
appointed to ‘inquire into the role of South Africa’s tax system in the promotion of 
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inclusive economic growth, employment creation, development and fiscal 
sustainability’194 and was required to address concerns about BEPS. 
 
The OECD published195 its final report on harmful tax practices and stated that:  
 
there is no suggestion that a unilateral Advance Pricing programme is by itself a 
preferential [tax] regime.  
 
Thus the OECD recognises there is no suggestion that APAs or advance tax rulings 
are viewed as a preferential tax regime. It was further recommended that the 
spontaneous exchange of key information on APAs and advance tax rulings between 
tax administrations would provide a useful cross check.196  
 
In its interim report the Davis Tax Committee197 commented on APAs in the light of 
harmful tax practices as discussed above. In summary, it stated that transparency 
between revenue authorities was especially important in connection with rulings, 
including Unilateral APAs and certain administrative practices.198 
 
Subsequently the Davis Tax Committee has made comments and 
recommendations199 on South African legislation. Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 
58 of 1962 regulates how taxpayers should declare and account for international 
transactions. The same provision empowers SARS to make transfer pricing 
adjustments, if it is found to disagree with how a taxpayer calculated pricing between 
connected parties.  
As previously observed, SARS Practice Note 7 (1999) gives guidance on how 
transfer pricing should be approached by taxpayers in South Africa. The Practice 
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Note is based on the OECD Guidelines in relation to Transfer Pricing (1995).200 From 
the Davis Committee commentary201 on BEPS Action Plan 8, it appears the 
committee assumed that the OECD Guidelines (2010)202 are applied, rather than the 
previous OECD guidelines on transfer pricing.  
 
The Davis Tax Committee made an important general recommendation on transfer 
pricing in South Africa: 
 
The legislators should ensure that section 31 of the Income Tax Act refers to the 
OECD guidelines. This is stated in SARS Practice Note 7, but SARS Practice Notes 
are not legally binding. At least one legally binding General Ruling, as provided for in 
section 89 of the Tax Administration Act, 2011, should be enacted on section 31.203  
 
As stated in its recommendation,204 the Davis Committee makes reference to section 
89 of the Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011. When the provision is scrutinised, a 
Senior SARS official as defined in section 6(3) of the same Act:  
 
may issue a “binding general ruling” that is effective for …an indefinite period …and 
the “binding ruling” must state that it is a “binding ruling” under this section205 and the 
provisions of a tax Act which are the subject of the “binding ruling”.206  
 
Section 89(3) then provides the option for SARS to issue the general binding ruling 
in the format of an Interpretation Note or in another manner the Commissioner 
prescribes. 
 
The Davis Tax Committee’s recommendation is valid since the Practice Note is not 
binding and the draft Interpretation Note207 on Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 
published on 3 April 2013, is in draft format and does not address the issues of 
transfer pricing on goods and services between connected persons. 
 
                                            
200
  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1995) Report on transfer 
pricing guidelines for multinational enterprises and tax administrations, OECD: Paris. 
201
  Supra note 199. 
202
  Supra note 200. 
203
  Supra note 199. 
204
  Supra note 199. 
205
  Section 89, Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011. 
206
  Supra note 205. 
207
  Supra note 178. 
36 
 
For reasons stated above, it could be said that the South African taxpayer enjoys no 
certainty on how SARS will treat a transfer pricing in relation to cross border 
transactions within a group. Due to the wide interpretation of legislation and omission 
of the fact that the transfer pricing legislation is based on the OECD guidelines 
(2010),208 South African taxpayers’ and companies’ part of a MNE are exposed to 
the risk of double taxation and, eventually, the lengthy legal process of dispute. 
 
South African taxpayers also have no general binding ruling on how international 
transactions are viewed from the perspective of SARS. HMRC has clear 
guidelines209 as discussed earlier in this research report.  
 
The key problem is the specific exclusion of pricing agreements from the Advance 
Ruling provisions as set out in Chapter 7 of the South African Tax Administration 
Act, 28 of 2011. It is stated in section 80 of the Tax Administration Act, that SARS 
will not even consider an application with regard to the ‘the pricing of goods or 
services supplied by or rendered to a connected person in relation to the 
applicant’.210 
 
The absence of APA legislation and the exclusion of advance rulings on transfer 
pricing in South Africa may create a disparity in the differential application of transfer 
pricing methods by SARS and revenue authorities in other tax jurisdictions. The 
South African DTA with the UK is based mainly on the OECD Model Tax Convention 
on Income and on Capital (2014).211 
 
                                            
208
  The general binding ruling could refer to future Transfer Pricing Guidelines which could be 
published. 
209
  Supra note 145. 
210
  Section 80(1)(a)(iii), Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011. 
211
  OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2014), with reservations as previously 
mentioned. 
37 
 
THE APPLICATION OF THE MUTUAL AGREEMENT PROCEDURE IN 
CONTEXT OF THE SA/UK DOUBLE TAXATION AGREEMENT 
The question is whether a transfer pricing adjustment could be prevented by article 
24 of the SA/UK DTA,212 should double taxation occur.213 Article 24 is referred to as 
the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP). The MAP would be applicable in the case 
of a South African taxpayer who is part of a MNE that is also liable for tax in the UK. 
In this case, the SA/UK DTA214 would be applied to determine the profit attributable 
to each entity. HMRC applies the MAP in advance where multilateral agreements are 
in place and gives guidance on pricing between connected persons, before a 
taxpayer submits a return.215  
 
Due to the fact that South African domestic legislation does not allow for the APA, no 
remedy exists for the taxpayer until after the annual event of taxation. The MAP 
would only become applicable after the event of tax and only in the scenario where a 
dispute exists.  
CONCLUSION – DOUBLE TAXATION AS A RESULT OF DISPARITIES IN 
SA/UK LEGISLATION 
The tax treaty between South Africa and the UK216 makes no provision for mutual 
agreement on the treatment of a transaction prior to the event of tax. It is important 
to highlight the fact that in the UK, HMRC allows for self-assessment with regard to 
income tax. In South Africa, SARS has not yet formalised self-assessment for 
income tax. Self-assessment is defined as follows: 
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Self-Assessment – System under which the taxpayer is required to declare the basis of 
his assessment (e.g. taxable income), to submit a calculation of the tax due and, 
usually, to accompany his calculation with payment of the amount he regards as due. 
The role of tax authorities is to check (perhaps in random cases) that the taxpayer has 
correctly disclosed his income.217 
 
It could happen that HMRC gives an APA to a taxpayer in relation to a transaction 
concluded with a South African company. The UK taxpayer renders a return based 
on the APA and the South African taxpayer renders a tax return based on the same 
principles. Since SARS is not bound to accept or agree with the principles of the 
APA between HMRC and the UK taxpayer, SARS could still make a transfer pricing 
adjustment. The South African taxpayer could be negatively impacted with double 
taxation and understatement penalties.218 It could be said that the South African 
taxpayer was not afforded the opportunity to seek clarity on the treatment of a pricing 
transaction and might not have made the perceived understatement had there been 
an opportunity to seek advance clarity, as in the case of the UK taxpayer.  
 
The next chapter will discuss the SA/UK DTA and will illustrate the disparity in tax 
treatment of a hypothetical transaction by HMRC and by SARS, causing double 
taxation and disputes. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE APPLICATION OF THE DOUBLE TAXATION 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED 
KINGDOM WITH AN EMPHASIS ON THE MISMATCH OF 
LEGISLATION 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE SA/UK DOUBLE TAXATION AGREEMENT WITH AN 
EMPHASIS ON THE EVENT OF DOUBLE TAXATION. 
A Double Taxation Agreement (DTA) is an international contractual agreement 
between contracting states. South Africa and the United Kingdom (UK) entered into 
a DTA with the full title: The Government of the Republic of South Africa and the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the 
avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on Income and Capital gains.219 The main purpose of the SA/UK DTA is to 
avoid double taxation with regard to taxes withheld at source in South Africa after 
1 January 2003. Taxes withheld at source and ‘other taxes’220 relate to income tax, 
capital gains tax and dividends tax.221 A protocol between South Africa and the UK 
was signed and published by the South African Revenue Service (SARS) on 
2 February 2012.222 The protocol made provision for the treatment of dividends tax, 
since the change in South African domestic legislation was effective from 1 April 
2012.223 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996, 
authorizes international agreements, and should the international agreement comply 
with the provisions set out in Section 231224 of the Constitution, the international 
agreement may be approved by Parliament.  
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Section 108 of the Income Tax Act225 is included in legislation to provide for entering 
into DTAs, which fundamentally are international agreements.  
 
The legislation is set out as follows: 
 
108. Prevention of or relief from, double taxation:  
(1)  The National Executive may enter into an agreement with the Government of 
any other country, whereby arrangements are made with such Government 
with a view to the prevention, mitigation or discontinuance of the levying, 
under the laws of the Republic and of such other country, of tax in respect of 
the same income, profits or gains, or tax imposed in respect of the same 
donation, or to the rendering of reciprocal assistance in the administration of 
and the collection of taxes under the said laws of the Republic and of such 
other country.  
(2)  As soon as may be after the approval by Parliament of any such agreement, 
as contemplated in section 231 of the Constitution, the arrangements thereby 
made shall be notified by publication in the Gazette and the arrangements so 
notified shall thereupon have effect as if enacted in this Act. 
 
From the above legislation it is clear that the SA/UK DTA and South African 
domestic legislation co-exist. The provisions set out in the DTA will not necessarily 
override226 the provisions of the Income Tax Act227 or inter alia the provisions of the 
Tax Administration Act.228 
 
The SA/UK DTA is based on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital (2014).229 The interpretation and application of the Double Taxation by SARS 
or Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) may be different. One area of 
concern could involve interpretation of the allocation of business profits, dealt with in 
article 7,230 which states in paragraph 1: 
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The profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that State 
unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a 
permanent establishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries on business as 
aforesaid, the profits of the enterprise may be taxed in the other State but only so 
much of them as is attributable to that permanent establishment.231 
 
The interpretation of Permanent Establishment (PE) is set out in article 5 of the 
SA/UK DTA, paragraphs (1) and (2):232  
 
It is stated in paragraph one:  
For the purposes of this Convention, the term “permanent establishment” means a 
fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly 
carried on.233 
 
In paragraph 2 the composition of a PE comprises is further defined:  
 
The term “permanent establishment” includes especially: 
(a) a place of management; 
(b) a branch; 
(c) an office; 
(d) a factory; 
(e) a workshop; 
(f) a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of extraction of natural 
resources; 
(g) an installation or structure for the exploration for natural resources.234  
 
It is therefore quite possible for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) to have an 
economic presence in another tax jurisdiction. In the application of the SA/UK DTA 
as stated in article 9,235 it is acknowledged that profits and expenses between 
associated enterprises should be allocated based on the arm’s length principle236 
and as if they are independent enterprises. Article 9237 governs the allocation of 
profits and should be interpreted before the tie breaker clause, article 24238 the 
Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP), becomes available to resolve the correct 
allocation of profit and expenses in the context of double taxation. 
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In the UK, taxpayers may use Advanced Pricing Agreements (APAs)239 to determine 
the arm’s length price of transactions between MNEs prior to entering into 
transactions or prior to the declaration of profits and expenses. Taxpayers residing in 
the UK therefore have certainty on how a transaction will be treated by HRMC. In 
South Africa, advance rulings240 on pricing goods and services supplied to 
associated enterprises are not provided for in local tax legislation. 
 
In the event of differing treatment of an international transaction by SARS and 
HMRC, the taxpayer would have to seek recourse to avoid double taxation. A 
hypothetical case study was compiled to illustrate possible double taxation and how 
the SA/UK DTA would be applied. 
 
HYPOTHETICAL CASE STUDY 
The hypothetical case study is based on the observation made by the OECD (2013) 
in the action plan on the prevention of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). 241 
The following was identified:  
 
Multinational Enterprises (MNE) now represent a large proportion of global GDP. Also, 
intra-firm trade represents a growing proportion of overall trade. Globalisation has 
resulted in a shift from country-specific operating models to global models based on 
matrix management organisations and integrated supply chains that centralise several 
functions at a regional or global level.242 
 
One objective of the OECD during the BEPS project, in the context of transfer 
pricing, was to improve the rules and place more emphasis on value creation in 
integrated groups. The main issue to be considered in the context of transfer pricing 
and value creation is ‘the use of intangibles, risks, capital and other high-risk 
transactions to shift profits’.243  
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The OECD published a report on the impact of BEPS in low-income countries.244 
The report recognises that BEPS has a greater impact on developing countries 
where MNEs have affiliates.245 It is recognised that affiliates of MNEs with a 
presence in developing countries are most often ‘recipients rather than the providers 
of finance, services and intellectual property’.246 This could therefore result, inter alia, 
in excessive payments for services, professional fees management fees, interest, 
royalties and dividends. 
 
It is reported that ‘as a share of all revenue, corporate income tax is more important 
to the poorest developing countries than in the developed countries’.247  
 
[The] revenue loss from BEPS may be particularly important for resource-rich 
developing countries. …the taxation of natural resources is possibly the single biggest 
make or break fiscal concern.248  
 
The hypothetical case study is further based on this remark made by the OECD249 
and includes cross border transactions between MNEs in a developed country such 
as the UK and a developing country such as South Africa where natural resources 
are exported. A similar example was discussed in an article published on transfer 
pricing.250 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the hypothetical group structure of an MNE. The value creation—
‘the use of intangibles, risks and capital’251—should be kept in mind for the purposes 
of the hypothetical case study. 
 
The possibility exists that some key directors hold directorships in more than one 
company in the group. 
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Figure 1: Schematic of Hypothetical Group Structure. 
 
From the above schematic of the hypothetical group structure of an MNE, 
consideration should be given to value creation, the use of intangibles, risks and 
capital. The supply chain is the key to value creation. 
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Supply Chain 
The supply chain is illustrated in Figure 2. The South African Mineral Mine Group is 
responsible for the mining activities and has a subsidiary with refinery capabilities. 
The UK Marketing and Distribution Company could import the ore or any of the 
refined product or bye products. The value-adding and main economic activity takes 
place in South Africa. The marketing and distribution activities are conducted by the 
UK Company and then sold to either associated or independent enterprises. 
 
 
Figure 2: Schematic of Hypothetical Supply Chain.  
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Value Creation 
In the hypothetical case study, the physical operations of the mining activities are 
conducted in South Africa. The ore supply chain, as illustrated in Figure 2 above, 
indicates that the main economic activities of the MNE take place in South Africa. 
 
The opportunity for the MNE to make use of transfer pricing in order to shift profit is a 
possibility. The South African-associated enterprises of the MNE could shift the profit 
to the UK as a tax planning mechanism. 
 
It should be further noted that the UK-based MNE invested heavily in intellectual 
property and in part of the infrastructure constructed in South Africa. The UK-based 
MNE should be entitled to receive interest on the capital invested and royalties on 
the intellectual property used to make the mining operations more efficient.  
 
The use of Intangibles 
Comparable data used in the determination of an arm’s length price could be applied 
differently by developed countries and developing countries. This could be the first 
intangible identified.  
 
The OECD (2014)252 identified that MNEs could exploit the fact that comparable data 
is not easily obtainable within the context of a transfer pricing transaction between 
associated enterprises. 
 
Further research conducted by the OECD (2015)253 indicates that challenges exist 
due to ‘a lack of comparability between the intangible related transactions 
undertaken between associated enterprises and those transactions that can be 
identified between independent enterprises’.254 
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In the hypothetical case study, the pricing of marketing, distribution, professional 
services, management fees, interest and royalties could be difficult to compare with 
transactions between independent enterprises. 
 
The pricing of minerals could be comparable in unique situations where rare 
minerals are in high demand and mainly produced in a developing country, when 
MNEs could make use of intangibles. 
 
Risks and Capital 
In the hypothetical case study, the risks involved in operations are assumed by the 
South African group of mineral companies. The risk of borrowing capital from the 
parent MNE and local sources could place additional pressure on the South African 
company to produce income to fund its operations and service its debt. 
 
Since the South African group of companies has assumed the risk of employment, it 
is indicative that the MNE’s main business risk and capital was assumed in South 
Africa. 
 
The South African Group of Companies also assumes the risk of fluctuation in the 
foreign exchange rate and could be making interest payments based on British 
Pounds. Fluctuations in the exchange rate and the volatility of the Rand could raise 
the South African company’s expenses. 
 
Transfer Pricing Adjustment 
In the event of a transfer pricing audit by SARS, and in the event of a difference in 
application of the arm’s length principle, SARS could raise an additional 
assessment255 if it was found that prejudice to the fiscus had occurred. 
 
The UK-based MNE could have applied for an APA with HMRC and would have had 
certainty on how to calculate the arm’s length prices. The APA would not have been 
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  Section 92 of the Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011. 
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enforceable on the South African group of companies since it would not have been a 
party to the agreement. The UK-based MNE is therefore exposed to the risk of 
double taxation as a result of a possible transfer pricing adjustment. 
 
Due to the lack of comparable data in developing economies as against developed 
economies, the arm’s length price of transactions between associated enterprises of 
the MNE could be calculated differently by the different revenue authorities. In the 
hypothetical case study above, the transfer pricing transactions between the 
associated enterprises part of the MNE could be treated differently by SARS and 
HMRC. For example, it could be said that the sales of the South African group of 
companies were understated and that excessive management fees, royalties and 
interest were paid to the UK-based MNE. SARS could increase the tax liability of the 
South African group of companies. The UK-based MNE would not have treated the 
transaction in the same way and should be able to reduce the profit declared in the 
UK by the same amount that the profit of the South African group of companies was 
increased. This disparity in the treatment of the international transaction between 
associated enterprises could have been avoided if advance rulings256 or APAs had 
been available to the South African taxpayer. 
 
THE EVENT OF TAXATION 
Taxpayers in South Africa are obliged to submit an annual tax return. Upon 
submission of a return, the annual event of tax occurs. The Tax Administration 
Act, 28 of 2011, defines a ‘taxable event’257 as ‘an occurrence which affects or may 
affect the liability of a person to tax’.258 
 
It is interesting to note that ambiguity in the above interpretation exists with the 
inclusion of the concept that an event may be a future possibility, which would affect 
the taxpayer’s tax liability.  
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Without giving the definition of ‘taxable event’ a wide interpretation, the first taxable 
event would occur when a taxpayer submits its return in the first place. The second 
possible ‘taxable event’ could occur if an audit was conducted and an adjustment 
made. This would be in the instance where it was found that prejudice to the fiscus 
had occurred. 
 
It should be kept in mind that in the event of double taxation, the provisions set out in 
the DTA would be applied to seek remedy for the disparity. 
 
THE SITUATION OF DOUBLE TAXATION 
Where it is found that prejudice to the fiscus occurred, SARS may raise an 
additional259 assessment. The taxpayer has the right, within domestic legislation, to 
dispute260 the additional assessment and the tax liability, including any penalties that 
could have been raised. If the taxpayer and SARS cannot reach agreement on the 
treatment, in the context of a transfer pricing adjustment, and application of the arm’s 
length principle, double taxation could become a reality. 
 
Double taxation could have occurred since the MNE might have already submitted a 
declaration in the UK, as illustrated in the hypothetical case study, and might have 
calculated the allocation of profits and expenses on the arm’s length principle as 
interpreted and applied by the MNE. The taxpayer would have to seek recourse to 
correct the disparity. 
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REMEDIES TO CORRECT THE DISPARITY 
A South African resident would be able to lodge a notice of objection.261 The dispute 
could be a lengthy and a costly process. If SARS disallows the grounds of the 
objection, the taxpayer has recourse and could lodge an appeal.262 It is confirmed 
that there have been no transfer pricing court cases in South Africa,263 which leads 
to the question: What remedies are available to correct the disparity of double 
taxation? 
 
The disparity of double taxation could be addressed through the DTA if the South 
African taxpayer applies to the competent authority of the contracting state. The 
event of double taxation is two-fold. Firstly, as illustrated in the hypothetical case 
study, in South Africa the taxpayer’s tax liability would have increased due to the 
possible increase in income and the decrease in expenses. Secondly, the related 
adjustment would not have been made by the UK resident in its declaration to 
HMRC. 
 
The disparity and the occurrence of double taxation are direct results of the 
differences in the domestic law of both South Africa and the UK, as illustrated in the 
hypothetical case study. The main difference applicable to the hypothetical case 
study is the application of the arm’s length principle and the fact that domestic 
legislation in South Africa lacks APAs.  
 
It could also be noted that in the APA process, HMRC has the advantage of being 
able to agree on a transfer pricing method, or arm’s length price, in advance. It could 
be said that the transfer pricing examination occurs in real time in the UK, for 
taxpayers who have applied for an APA. In the UK, transfer pricing examinations are 
conducted both in advance and subsequent to the submission of a return.  In South 
Africa, SARS may conduct a transfer pricing audit on a taxpayer for previous tax 
years. The difference in auditing a transfer pricing transaction in advance could be 
both an advantage and a disadvantage for the UK taxpayer.  
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The UK taxpayer is subject to domestic law in the UK and time limits for tax 
assessments264 might be applicable. UK taxpayers have four years to make a 
correction to a return.265 If a transfer pricing adjustment was made in South Africa 
and the UK taxpayer had to make a downward adjustment in its tax return in the UK 
after the expiration period, there would be little or no remedy for correcting the 
disparity within the domestic legislation of the UK. In this case, double taxation in 
relation to the same transfer pricing transaction between associated enterprises of 
an MNE would occur. 
 
The same disparity could occur if HMRC makes a transfer pricing adjustment that 
could possibly affect a South African taxpayer. The expiration period for 
assessments in South Africa is three years.266 Domestic legislation in South Africa 
extends the expiration period by an extra three years267 where an assessment has 
been issued by SARS in relation to a transfer pricing adjustment.268 Double taxation 
could apply to the South African taxpayer in the same manner as indicated 
previously. 
 
The following chapter deals with the dispute process after a transfer pricing 
adjustment has been made and where remedies are sought to correct the disparity. 
It also deals with the consequences of double taxation. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE DISPUTE PROCESS AFTER A TRANSFER 
PRICING ADJUSTMENT 
 
THE DISPUTE PROCESS AFTER A TRANSFER PRICING ADJUSTMENT 
Revenue authorities could conduct an audit on examination of a return submitted by 
a taxpayer. The South African Revenue Service (SARS) audit process is described 
by Olivier and Honiball269 who state that ‘SARS issues the revised tax assessments, 
together with a letter explaining the reasons for the assessment’.270 As illustrated in 
Chapter 3, the example in the hypothetical case study could have led to double 
taxation of a transfer pricing transaction or a portion thereof. This chapter discusses 
the remedies a taxpayer should follow.  
 
In the Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011, the provisions dealing with dispute 
resolution are set out in Chapter 9.271 It is important to note that certain ‘rules’ exist 
within the dispute resolution process. In section 103(2)272 it is stated that:  
 
[t]he “rules” may provide for alternative dispute resolution procedures under which 
SARS and the person aggrieved by an assessment or “decision” may resolve a 
dispute. 
 
The ‘rules’ as set out in Public Notice No. 550 were published in the Government 
Gazette No. 37819 dated 11 July 2014. The South African Revenue Service issued 
these ‘rules’ as provided for in section 103.273 
 
Figure 3 below is a schematic illustration of the process that could be followed by 
SARS and taxpayers. The schematic illustrates the process from the time of 
assessment by SARS until the case goes to appeal. The process as illustrated in 
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Figure 3 should be interpreted together with the ‘rules’ published in the Government 
Gazette No. 37819, dated 11 July 2014. 
 
 
Figure 3: Schematic of the dispute resolution process. 
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The remedies to correct the disparity of double taxation as discussed in this chapter 
are the most likely ones to follow in the case of a transfer pricing adjustment and do 
not include other provisions in the Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011, which could 
also be utilised to seek correction of an assessment 
 
In rule 7 of the public notice274 it is required that any objection against an 
assessment275 must be delivered in the required format and within 30 business days 
of the assessment. Where a taxpayer exercises the right to request reasons for the 
assessment, the taxpayer should submit the objection within 30 business days after 
SARS has furnished reasons for the assessment. It is also stated that a taxpayer 
should ‘specify the grounds of the objection in detail’. 276 
 
Taxpayers should be aware that the ‘rules’277 and the application of the provisions as 
set out in Chapter 9: Dispute Resolution278 are applied in conjunction and should the 
‘rules’ not be adhered to, an objection may be deemed invalid or may be disallowed 
by SARS. 
 
Emphasis must be placed on the fact that the grounds of an objection need to be 
detailed and specific in respect of the assessment that had been issued. Lack of 
sufficient grounds could lead to an objection being disallowed by SARS. If an 
objection is disallowed, the taxpayer could lodge an appeal against an assessment.  
 
Section 107 of the Tax Administration Act, is the governing provision that deals with 
an appeal against an assessment. Rule 10279 states that the appeal must be lodged 
within 30 business days of the date on which the notice of disallowance of the appeal 
was delivered. It is further stated that the appeal must be in the prescribed format; in 
rule 10(c) it is stated: 
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(c) specify in detail- 
 (i) In respect of which grounds of the objection referred to in rule 7 the taxpayer 
is appealing; 
 (ii) the grounds for disputing the basis of the decision to disallow the objection 
referred to in section 106(5); and  
(iii) any new ground on which the taxpayer is appealing; 
 
In terms of section 107(2) a senior SARS official may in two instances extend the 
period within which an appeal must be lodged. The first instance is that where 
reasonable grounds exist, the time period may be extended by 21 business days. 
The second instance is where ‘exceptional circumstances exist that justify an 
extension beyond 21 business days’.280 
 
The appeal against an assessment is dealt with by the tax board281 and the decision 
by the tax board must be delivered to the taxpayer within 60 days of the hearing.282 If 
the taxpayer or SARS are not satisfied with the outcome of the appeal, it may be 
referred to a tax court.283 
 
Since no transfer pricing cases have been reported in South Africa,284 the dispute 
process with regard to litigation is not discussed. If a taxpayer is still not satisfied 
with the outcome of a dispute or an appeal as set out in sections 104 and 107285 the 
taxpayer could approach SARS and request a settlement.286 The procedure for a 
settlement is set out in the provisions of section 147.287 A settlement would only be 
considered in the following circumstances as stated in section 146:288 
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The Commissioner may, if it is to the best advantage of the state, “settle” a “dispute”, 
in whole or in part, on a basis that is fair and equitable to both the person concerned 
and to SARS, having regard to— 
(a) whether the “settlement” would be in the interest of good management of the tax 
system, overall fairness, and the best use of SARS’ resources; 
(b) SARS’ cost of litigation in comparison to the possible benefits with reference to the 
prospects of success in court; 
(c) whether there are any— 
(i) complex factual issues in contention; or 
(ii) evidentiary difficulties, 
which are sufficient to make the case problematic in outcome or  
unsuitable for resolution through the alternative “dispute” resolution procedures or the 
courts;289 
 
The above description of circumstances in which it is appropriate to settle could be 
applied to cases where a dispute exists in relation to a transfer pricing adjustment. A 
typical transfer pricing dispute satisfies most of the circumstanced laid out in 
section 146 of the Tax Administration Act, where a settlement is appropriate. In such 
cases it could be more cost-effective to resolve the dispute through a settlement, 
especially in cases where the facts and issues are complex. If ‘evidentiary 
difficulties’290 exist within transfer pricing disputes, reaching an outcome could be 
problematic. 
 
The taxpayer and SARS may come to a settlement agreement that is final if the 
taxpayer meets all the obligations set out in the terms of the settlement agreement. 
Section 148 of the Tax Administration Act, states that the agreement would be void if 
the taxpayer had made any false declarations during the agreement process and of 
the taxpayer fails to make payment of the amount agreed upon. 
 
It needs to be highlighted that should SARS agree to settle with a taxpayer, SARS is 
obliged to maintain a register of settlements and processes followed. This should be 
reported to Auditor General of South Africa and to the Minister of Finance. It should 
further be emphasised that a settlement agreement’s main objective is to seek the 
fair treatment of a taxpayer in cases where no fair outcome could be reached 
through the normal dispute process. 
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In transfer pricing cases, taxpayers could also apply for the relief of double taxation 
through the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP).291 
 
THE MUTUAL AGREEMENT PROCEDURE AFTER A TRANSFER PRICING 
ADJUSTMENT 
The MAP is a mechanism available to taxpayers in the event of double taxation or 
when it is foreseen that double taxation could occur in future. The MAP is set out in 
article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2014). The 
definition and aim of Model Tax Conventions are, inter alia, to prevent double 
taxation.  
 
It should be kept in mind that article 24292 should be read and applied in the context 
of the objective of the Convention293 and regard should be given to the OECD 
commentary in relation to the Convention. 
 
The MAP is defined by the OECD as follows: 
 
Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) – A means through which tax administrations 
consult to resolve disputes regarding the application of double tax conventions. This 
procedure, described and authorized by article 25 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention, can be used to eliminate double taxation that could arise from a transfer 
pricing adjustment.294 
 
The MAP could be applied when ‘cross border tax disputes’295 arise. It is also further 
indicated that the MAP ‘will include issues of transfer pricing’296 in the event of 
double taxation on a cross border transaction within a MNE. A taxpayer who is not in 
agreement with the tax treatment of a transaction, resulting in double taxation, 
should follow domestic dispute resolution procedures and could apply for a MAP as 
a mechanism to correct the disparity.  
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The first question that arises is: When should a taxpayer apply for a MAP? The 
second question would be: Is the MAP the only mechanism available as remedy to 
seek recourse for the disparity in the event of double taxation? Lastly, should a 
taxpayer be able to follow the dispute resolution process and follow the MAP at the 
same time?  
 
Figure 4 is a schematic illustration of possibly the most cost-effective manner for a 
taxpayer to make use of the MAP as a mechanism to resolve a tax treatment 
disparity. This is an illustration of how the dispute resolution process could be 
incorporated with the MAP. 
 
 
Figure 4: Schematic of the dispute resolution process incorporated with the 
Mutual Agreement Procedure. 
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Olivier and Honiball recognise that:297  
 
the most common cases for which the Mutual Agreement Procedure is used are …the 
attribution of profits and expenditure to a Permanent Establishment, …adjustments 
between associated enterprises, …the treatment of interest as dividend expenditure 
under thin capitalisation rules.298 
 
Olivier and Honiball299 also state that ‘it is specifically provided that the Mutual 
Agreement Procedure exists irrespective of any domestic remedies’ and then refer to 
article 25(1) of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2010). It 
is also stated that: 300 
 
the result is that a taxpayer who makes use of the Mutual Agreement Procedure may 
still want or need to object and appeal against an assessment in terms of domestic 
law.’301 It is further stated302 that ‘the use of the Mutual Agreement Procedure is not 
subject to domestic remedies first being exhausted.303  
 
This is indicative that the MAP and the domestic dispute resolution process could be 
applied independently of one another. It is important to highlight that from a South 
African perspective, a taxpayer’s Mutual Agreement application could be viewed 
more seriously if a valid dispute within domestic legislation existed. Should a 
taxpayer wish to apply for a MAP, in seeking the correction of a disparity of a tax 
treatment, protocol could be followed as indicated by the OECD.304 
 
The OECD has published305 the profiles of the MAP for participating countries. It 
should be noted that once a taxpayer has applied for the MAP, the matter is not 
between the taxpayer and the revenue authority. It becomes a negotiation between 
the contracting states. 
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It is recognised that ‘it is important to note that article 25(2) obliges the two states to 
negotiate, but the two states are merely obliged to use their best endeavours to 
reach mutual agreement and are not obliged to reach a specific agreement’.306  
 
The contracting states may give a mandate to the competent authorities of both 
contracting states in relation to a Double Taxation Agreement (DTA), and these 
authorities could then reach some form of agreement. 
 
It is stated in the Manual on Effective Mutual Agreement Procedures (MEMAP)307 
that should the competent authorities reach an agreement, the contracting states 
should exchange letters ‘and where required the taxpayer has accepted the 
resolution, a competent authority should give, or arrange to give, it effect in its 
jurisdiction’.308 
 
The comment made by Olivier and Honiball309 should be taken seriously upon 
deciding if it is appropriate for an associate of an MNE to apply for the MAP within a 
DTA. It is stated that ‘taxpayers are not directly involved …the outcome of the 
arbitration is not binding on the taxpayer, only on the competent authorities’.310 The 
outcome and reasons for reaching an agreement, reaching a partial agreement or 
not reaching an agreement at all, might not be disclosed to the taxpayer due to 
secrecy provisions within domestic legislation. 
 
It is important to note that a taxpayer should first follow the dispute process 
applicable in the tax jurisdiction where the double taxation has occurred. It needs to 
be emphasised that a South African taxpayer should first declare a dispute before 
applying for the MAP. In South Africa the dispute resolution process is transparent 
and SARS is obliged to communicate reasons for not allowing a dispute. 
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The MAP is available as remedy for the disparity and could be used in conjunction 
with the dispute process as applied in domestic law. It would be the taxpayer’s 
decision, based on the affordability of professional advice and the value of the 
double taxation in question. It should be kept in mind that the MAP and remedies 
within domestic legislation could be applied at the same time. This could lead to a 
‘duplication of effort’. 311 This should not be the main reason why both remedies 
could not be pursued at the same time. It would be the taxpayer’s choice to follow 
either the MAP, domestic remedies for the disparity, or the MAP in conjunction with 
domestic legislation. 
 
The MEMAP312 gives clarity on the ‘interaction between MAP and domestic recourse 
provisions’.313 It is stated that should the MAP not be successful, the taxpayer could 
still choose ‘domestic recourse’.314  
 
The Convention315 indicates that a taxpayer should submit the application within 
three years after first receiving the notification of the action resulting in taxation not in 
accordance with the provisions of the Convention.316 The MEMAP317 indicates that 
the ideal time frame for a MAP to reach finalisation should be within two years. 
 
The time and effort taken to solve the disparity of double taxation could be lengthy 
and costly for both a taxpayer and a revenue authority. This is the main reason a 
taxpayer’s request for a settlement agreement318 could be entertained by SARS. 
 
Should advance rulings or advance pricing legislation be available to taxpayers in 
relation to South African transfer pricing transactions, the need to follow the dispute 
resolution process would be avoided or dramatically reduced. 
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DECREASE IN TAX YIELD 
It could be possible that as a result of the dispute resolution process and the 
settlement of a transfer pricing transaction, South Africa would receive less tax in 
relation to a transfer pricing transaction than if a bilateral Advance Pricing Agreement 
(APA) was entered into.  
 
If advance rulings on transfer pricing transactions were available to taxpayers in 
South Africa, both the taxpayer and SARS would have certainty on the pricing of a 
cross border transaction and this could lead to an increase in tax yield.  
 
If a bilateral APA was entered into, it would have fairly allocated the profits of 
associated enterprises in advance, rather than resulting in a situation where double 
taxation occurred.  
 
In order to correct the disparity of double taxation, SARS and the taxpayer could 
enter into a settlement agreement. This would ensure the taxpayer was treated fairly. 
It could however mean that the South African tax authority is at a loss due to the lack 
of APAs in South Africa and the mismatch in legislation of another jurisdiction.  
 
The OECD (2012)319 states it is important to note:  
 
that Advance Pricing Agreements are not used to provide preferential or advantageous 
treatment to individual taxpayers as part of a “tax incentive” strategy. Not only would 
such an approach undermine tax yield, …it would lead to uncertainty …320   
 
It is further stated that APAs could be implemented and be in accordance with 
‘internationally accepted standards on transfer pricing’.321 It would be ideal if one 
revenue authority did not collect more revenue at the expense of another revenue 
authority due to the disparity of legislation of either jurisdiction. 
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The application of domestic legislation and preferential tax regimes could attract 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). This may be due to the likelihood that a MNE would 
be exposed to a less burdensome tax obligation and that the MNE would have more 
certainty on the tax treatment of cross border transactions. 
 
With globalisation and the integration of economies it has become easier for a MNE 
to change the place of effective management and therefore disinvest from a country 
where there is little certainty on the tax treatment of global transactions. 
 
DISINVESTMENT BY MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
The economic climate in South Africa has been reported as ‘slow and 
deteriorating’.322 It was indicated in the Economic Overview conducted by the South 
African National Treasury that:  
 
the global economic growth outlook has weakened in recent months, led by a sharp 
slowdown in developing countries. The outlook for the South African economy has also 
deteriorated as a result of lower commodity prices, higher borrowing costs and 
diminished confidence. Currency weakness is putting upward pressure on inflation and 
the agriculture sector is suffering the effects of a severe drought. GDP growth is 
expected to improve gradually over the medium term, reaching 2.4 per cent in 2018.323 
 
Disinvestment from one country to another may be linked to the economic climate 
and the volatility of the currency. Disinvestment by MNEs would be detrimental for 
the National Treasury, as the likelihood of revenue collection would decrease.  
 
It was reported by Hogg (2016) in an article published by Fin24 that the ‘falling Rand 
means Barclays to lose £400m on decade-long Absa investment’.324 It was also 
reported that:  
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according to the Financial Times of London, the new Barclays management team has 
gone through the motions over the past three months and is set to confirm the biggest 
disinvestment in South Africa since the spate that hit the country during the mid 1980s. 
Sceptics are concerned that the Barclays sale will spark a similar exodus.325  
 
From observation of the movement of capital by South African companies or their 
investors, it is clearly visible that disinvestment from South Africa is occurring. The 
lack of substantial economic growth, lack of employment opportunities and the 
occurrence of emigration have become pressing issues. Emigration of skilled people 
is a loss to the domestic tax base. These emigrants will be taxed in the jurisdiction of 
their new residence.  
 
Statistics South Africa conducted a Community Survey (2016) inter alia on 
emigration. Statistics South Africa in its Community Survey (2016)326 reported data 
indicated that most emigrants who left the country between 2006 and 2016:  
 
were aged between 25 and 29 years old and left South Africa between 2011 and 2015, 
with the highest proportion leaving in 2015. Gauteng reported the highest proportion of 
emigrants. The highest proportion of emigrants moved to Mozambique, Zimbabwe and 
Australia. Individuals emigrated for a wide variety of reasons which included 
employment, study and business.327 
 
Disinvestment has a direct link with the economic climate of a country. FDI in a 
country could be promoted if a country had a favourable tax regime together with 
business opportunities.  
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Fair fiscal policies ensure that revenue authorities have the sovereign right to apply 
domestic legislation and to collect revenue. It is paramount for all countries to collect 
revenue in order to sustain development. The OECD (2016) recognised that:  
 
effective tax systems are a critical building block for increased domestic resource 
mobilisation which is essential for sustainable development, promoting self-reliance, 
good governance, growth and stability, with particular relevance to developing 
countries.328 
 
For a country’s tax system to be fair, taxpayer’s rights and obligations play an 
important role. Taxpayer certainty is one of the aspects MNEs would consider, 
should they consider to invest and conduct cross border transactions. 
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CHAPTER 5: FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO 
ADVANCE PRICING AGREEMENTS 
 
TAXPAYER CERTAINTY 
It was reported by the OECD, in ‘Taxpayers’ rights and obligations’,329 that most 
countries’ tax systems include the following basic rights: the right to be informed, 
assisted and heard; the right of appeal; the right to pay no more than the correct 
amount of tax; the right to certainty; the right to privacy; the right to confidentiality 
and secrecy.330 
 
It is acknowledged in the publication dealing with taxpayers’ rights and obligations:  
 
that a survey was conducted in 1990 and these rights were identified as most 
important to taxpayers. It is stated that “Taxpayers also have a right to a high degree 
of certainty as to the tax consequences of their actions”. Of course, certainty is not 
always possible. For example, taxpayers may not always know in advance the effect of 
rules that are dependent on the facts and circumstances in a particular case. Also, tax 
authorities may not be obligated to provide the taxpayer with certainty in relation to the 
application of anti-abuse provisions aimed at taxpayers seeking to circumvent the 
intent of the legislation. However, it is clearly a goal that taxpayers should be able to 
anticipate the consequences of their ordinary personal and business affairs. Achieving 
this goal is often difficult because modern tax systems are complex and evolving.331 
 
In South Africa a taxpayer has the right to request an advance ruling.332 One 
exception to advance rulings is that the South African Revenue Service (SARS) 
would not accept the application of an advance ruling if the request is made in 
relation to the pricing of goods and services333 between associated enterprises that 
form part of a MNE, as mentioned previously.  
 
It may not always be possible to provide taxpayers with certainty regarding all tax 
treatments by a revenue authority as in certain cases the facts and circumstances 
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could be unique. The need for taxpayers to have certainty on the treatment of 
transfer pricing transactions between associated enterprises could lead to a likely 
increase in tax yield. 
 
LIKELY INCREASE IN TAX YIELD 
The question remains whether a revenue authority would achieve an increase in tax 
yield if it had an Advance Pricing Agreement programme? Two of the ‘taxpayer 
rights’ identified by the OECD334 are firstly: to have a ‘right of appeal’; and secondly 
‘the right to pay no more than the correct amount of tax’.335  
 
It would not be good practice to implement an Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) 
programme if the main reason was to increase the tax yield of a revenue authority. It 
is also stated by the OECD (2012)336 ‘that Advance Pricing Agreements are not used 
to provide preferential or advantageous treatment to individual taxpayers as part of a 
“tax incentive” strategy. Not only would such an approach undermine tax yield…’ but 
it could also bring the revenue authorities’ reputation into disrepute. 
 
If an APA programme is brought into South African legislation, it should be based on 
the taxpayer’s right ‘to pay no more than the correct amount of tax’ and ‘the right to 
certainty’.337 Taxpayer certainty could lead to a more stable investment climate. This 
may lead to MNEs trading within the South African jurisdiction and could, inter alia, 
lead to an indirect increase in tax yield.  
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AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES AND SKILLS 
The availability of resources and skills within a revenue authority would be one of the 
first aspects to take into account, should it consider introducing an APA programme. 
The OECD (2012)338 recognises that the same resources and skills are used in the 
auditing function of a revenue authority as would be used in an Advance Pricing 
Arrangement programme. It is stated that:  
 
It is likely that an APA can be carried out more efficiently than an audit into the same 
transaction(s). An APA will normally use contemporaneous data, and the taxpayer will 
have an incentive to co-operate and provide all relevant data and information. As 
mentioned above, it is arguable that only compliant taxpayers will apply for an APA, 
and there is thus a danger that scarce and valuable resource is tied up with compliant 
taxpayers, at the expense of time spent on auditing high risk cases.339 
 
It could be said that a revenue authority would need to weigh up the advantages and 
disadvantages of dividing the available resources and skills between an Advance 
Pricing programme and its current transfer pricing audit department. It would need to 
establish if enough resources are available to maintain a good balance in allocating 
them between the transfer pricing auditing function and the APA programme. If the 
transfer pricing auditing function does not have the capacity to conduct an Advance 
Pricing Arrangement programme, it would not be advantageous for the revenue 
authority to implement such a programme. 
 
CAPACITY TO CONDUCT AN ADVANCE PRICING PROGRAMME 
If capacity does not exist within a revenue authority to conduct an Advance Pricing 
Arrangement programme (APA), it would not be feasible to implement such a 
programme on a large scale. It could also be said that revenue authorities would be 
able to collect valuable data that could be applied in future transfer pricing audits.  
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The OECD (2012)340 made an important observation: 
 
It is sometimes argued that less experienced tax administrations may lack the 
knowledge and skills to negotiate fair APAs, especially when faced with large, well-
advised multinational enterprises. Similarly, in the case of bilateral and multilateral 
APAs, there is a perceived risk that less experienced countries may be disadvantaged 
in negotiations by more experienced countries. 341 
 
International advisory firms may have better-skilled transfer pricing specialists. 
Olivier and Honiball342 identified that:  
 
the unavailability of an APA procedure to South Africa and the specific exclusion of the 
ability to obtain an advance tax ruling on the matter of the pricing of goods and 
services …is presumably because of a lack of administrative capacity within SARS. 
 
It was previously also observed by Oguttu343 that a lack of capacity within SARS 
might exist. The observation made by the OECD (2012)344 could be valid in the case 
where a lack of skills exists to conduct an Advance Pricing Arrangement programme. 
The lack of capacity could be detrimental to a revenue authority should it embark on 
an Advance Pricing Arrangement programme without the necessary skills. This is 
especially relevant if MNEs are well advised and that the outcome of an advance tax 
ruling could result in a disadvantage for the revenue authority. 
 
The utilisation of an APA programme could have an effect on the stability of the tax 
base.  
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STABILITY OF THE TAX BASE 
Stability in tax and taxpayer certainty are closely connected. It was stated in an 
article by Piper, ‘Stability in Tax’, that ‘[i]f taxpayers are making a decision today 
which will affect them into the future, they will benefit from being able to predict the 
impacts of that decision’.345  
 
The question is whether APAs or advance tax rulings would bring certainty and 
stability for MNEs conducting cross border transactions to and from South Africa?  
 
A minority of the South African population bears the burden of acting as the tax 
base. Joubert (2013)346 concluded from analysis of attribution to the tax base, that 
there are far fewer contributing taxpayers in South Africa than statistics released by 
SARS indicate. It is stated that:  
 
there is clearly a much larger imbalance between the number of people who are 
paying tax and the total population than is implied by SARS when they quote 
13,7 million as the number of taxpayers. Actually, only 3,3 million taxpayers pay 99% 
of all income tax …a very small number of South African taxpayers bear almost the 
entire weight of the South African state on their tired shoulders.347 
 
It would be beneficial to all South Africans if tax base erosion and, inter alia, profit 
shifting could be prevented. Further stability in the tax base could be promoted if 
taxpayer certainty with regard to transfer pricing was available to South African 
taxpayers.  
 
Due to a possible constraint in capacity, SARS could still in future consider an APA 
programme. Alternatives to the solution need to be analysed and compared with the 
OECD’s recommendations made during the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) 
project. The utilisation of a multilateral or a bilateral information-sharing agreement 
through treaty provisions was reviewed by the OECD during the BEPS project. 
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The sharing of information could be useful as an alternative to an APA programme. 
Should revenue authorities work together and create a platform where information is 
shared, MNEs would have no place to hide their profits.  
 
It is possible that the utilisation of a multilateral or bilateral information sharing 
agreement could be the answer to preventing BEPS in the absence of an APA 
programme in South Africa. 
 
ALTERNATIVE UTILISATION OF MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL 
INFORMATION SHARING AGREEMENTS BETWEEN REVENUE 
AUTHORITIES 
During the BEPS project, the OECD endeavoured within action 15 to:  
 
Develop a multilateral instrument – [to] analyse the tax and public international law 
issues related to the development of a multilateral instrument to enable jurisdictions 
that wish to do so to implement measures developed in the course of the work on 
BEPS and amend bilateral tax treaties. On the basis of this analysis, interested Parties 
will develop a multilateral instrument designed to provide an innovative approach to 
international tax matters, reflecting the rapidly evolving nature of the global economy 
and the need to adapt quickly to this evolution.348 
 
The action plan on the mandate to develop a multilateral instrument on tax treaty 
measures to tackle BEPS is only enforceable on OECD participating members. 
Since South Africa is not a member of the OECD, South Africa is not obliged to 
follow or agree to any multilateral or bilateral tax treaty measures. South Africa did 
agree to participate in the interim programme to share information on the basis of 
mutual assistance.  
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This was analysed by the Davis Tax Committee349 and summarised as follows: 
 
South Africa has so far signed the following multilateral agreements:  
African Tax Administration Forum Agreement on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters 
(signed 17 January 2014);  
OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance on Tax Matters (in 
operation from 1 March 2014); 
Southern African Development Community Agreement on Assistance in Tax Matters 
(signed 17 August 2013).350 
 
The Davis Tax Committee recommendations further encouraged South Africa to 
update: ‘existing multilateral agreements …in accordance with BEPS proposals, 
once finalised’.351 The Davis Tax Committee also expressed concern that ‘South 
Africa should wait for OECD BEPS proposals before signing further multilateral 
agreements’.352 The last and final recommendation the Davis Tax Committee made 
was that the: 
 
proposed OECD multilateral instrument to amend numerous bilateral treaties via a 
single instrument should be supported as a general principle, subject to such 
amendments being appropriate in the context of South Africa’s treaties.353 
 
Even though South Africa has followed OECD best practice as indicated in the BEPS 
project to prevent BEPS, the answer on whether APAs could aid in the prevention of 
BEPS is still uncertain. In conclusion, the advantages, disadvantages and the 
possible alternatives of implementing an APA programme in South Africa need to be 
analysed. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION  
 
GENERAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The lack of Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs) in South Africa could be seen as a 
negative aspect regarding taxpayer certainty from the point of view of Multinational 
Enterprises (MNEs). It would be advantageous for the South African Revenue 
Service (SARS) to consider the inclusion of APAs if an MNE already has a unilateral 
or bilateral APA in another tax jurisdiction. This could prevent double taxation and 
also the event of double non-taxation, as previously mentioned in this research 
report. 
 
Advance rulings on transfer pricing of goods and services are not available to South 
African taxpayers or MNEs with an economic presence in South Africa. The reason 
for exclusion of advance rulings on transfer pricing is not known. The OECD 
(2012)354 recognised that revenue authorities may have to ‘face a balance between 
using scarce resources in an APA programme and in auditing’.355 Many options are 
available to SARS. Some considerations to be taken into account when considering 
the options are: efficiency, effectiveness and scarcity of resources involved. The 
resources could involve litigation costs during a dispute as well the value of tax 
leakage caused by double non-taxation. 
 
Firstly, APAs form part of the OECD guidelines (2010)356 on transfer pricing matters. 
It is recognised that APAs could be agreed upon for a period of three to five years 
and could be reviewed on an annual basis. If SARS considers implementing an APA 
programme, it is recommended that a value be placed on the amount for which such 
applications would be considered. This would ensure that only high value advance 
rulings could be made for the transfer pricing of goods and services.  
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If SARS considers permitting advance rulings on transfer pricing cases, it could 
consider following similar wording to that used in section 103 of the Tax 
Administration Act, 28 of 2011. A guide on the governing of advance rulings for 
transfer pricing cases could be formalised in a Government Gazette, similar to the 
public notice 550357 relating to dispute resolution. 
 
This could in effect resolve a dispute, should the taxpayer object to a transfer pricing 
adjustment made by SARS. The dispute process could be costly and absorb scarce 
transfer pricing resources. The implementation of advance tax rulings on transfer 
pricing cases could also prevent double non-taxation. This could be viewed as tax 
leakage that should be avoided. 
 
Secondly, if SARS does not have the capacity to conduct an Advance Pricing 
programme, the alternative options should be reviewed. SARS could build capacity 
in this area and implement a programme for advance rulings in the future. This would 
be advantageous to SARS since international developments358 are ongoing and 
further research may be required. 
 
Lastly, SARS could utilise available information on transfer pricing documentation as 
required in the submission of annual tax returns. The information could be utilised to 
establish risk and could focus on auditing high tax yield cases. SARS could also 
develop a programme to monitor the fluctuation of comparable data declared by 
taxpayers in order to determine the risk that may occur over a period of time.  
 
The Davis Tax Committee also made recommendations359 on transfer pricing risk 
assessment that are applicable to transfer pricing audits, in the absence of an APA 
programme.  
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DAVIS TAX COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS ON TRANSFER PRICING 
RISK ASSESSMENT 
The OECD (2015d)360 conducted research on the reporting requirements between 
multiple tax jurisdictions. The Davis Tax Committee recognises this as ‘necessary to 
conduct an informed transfer pricing risk assessment’. 361 It further indicates that:  
 
Effective risk identification and assessment constitute an essential early stage in the 
process of selecting appropriate cases for transfer pricing audits or enquiries and in 
focusing such audits on the most important issues. Because tax administrations 
operate with limited resources, it is important for them to accurately evaluate, at the 
very outset of a possible audit, whether a taxpayer’s transfer pricing arrangements 
warrant in-depth review and a commitment of significant tax enforcement resources.362 
 
In the absence of an APA programme, SARS should be focused on the early risk 
identification of possible transfer pricing cases and utilise scarce resources 
effectively. 
 
South Africa should consider international developments on capacity building, which 
should be available to tax administrations in future. It is important to note that the 
building of skills and sharing of information could be available through ‘Tax 
Inspectors Without Borders (TIWB)’.363 
 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS ON TAX ADMINISTRATIONS AND 
CAPACITY BUILDING 
The OECD released a report on ‘Tax Administrations and Capacity Building’ 
(2016).364 It is recognised that tax administrations should work together in order to 
streamline processes to avoid duplication and to ensure fair taxation of MNEs. 
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It is recognised that ‘[t]he increasing demand for capacity building’ exists. It further 
emphasises that ‘the extent to which it draws on scarce knowledge and skills, 
compels tax administrations to work smarter in delivering assistance’.365  
 
In practice, not only does this call for more cohesive and strategic ways of working with 
other stakeholders to avoid duplication and better identify best practices, but also that 
innovation be embraced. In this regard, solutions – such as the Knowledge Sharing 
Platform, a global online tool that enables tax administrations and tax organisations to 
more broadly and instantaneously share knowledge, expertise and innovative 
practices with counterparts.366 
 
SARS could consider conducting further research on how it as a revenue authority 
could participate and benefit from the capacity building platform that could in future 
ensure protection of the tax base and aid in the prevention of Tax Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (BEPS). Through the knowledge-sharing platform, double taxation and 
double non-taxation could also be addressed.  
 
 
‘An investment in knowledge always pays the best interest.’ – Benjamin Franklin 
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